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INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
EXCLUSION ORDERS FOR THE
INFRINGEMENT OF STANDARD-
ESSENTIAL PATENTS
J. Gregory Sidak*
A patent holder whose U.S. patents have been infringed may seek
redress for patent infringement from the U.S. International Trade Com-
mission (ITC) under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Section 337
authorizes the ITC, among other things, to investigate and bar from entry
into the United States products that infringe a valid and enforceable U.S.
patent. A holder of standard-essential patents (SEPs) that has committed
to license its SEPs on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND)
terms typically retains the right to file a complaint with the ITC. How-
ever, as of October 2016, no SEP holder has been able to enforce an
exclusion order against an infringer of SEPs. Limits on the availability of
exclusion orders for SEPs have largely arisen from concerns that that
remedy might facilitate patent holdup. In 2013, President Obama, acting
through the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), echoed those concerns in
vetoing an exclusion order that the ITC had issued against an infringer
of SEPs on the grounds that the exclusion order would not serve the
public interest in that specific case. The USTR instructed the ITC to ex-
amine, in future investigations, whether there is evidence that patent
holdup or holdout has occurred. However, a detailed analysis of the
ITC’s patent decisions shows that the ITC considered those allegations
even before President Obama’s veto. In addition, the ITC’s decisions
issued since President Obama’s veto have confirmed that, even after ex-
amining evidence of patent holdup, public interest considerations will
not necessarily weigh against the issuance of an exclusion order. Raising
concerns about the theoretical risk of patent holdup and presenting un-
supported allegations about the violation of a FRAND commitment will
be insufficient to advise against the issuance of an exclusion order. In
this Article, I examine the evidence that should inform the ITC’s decision
in investigations concerning SEPs. I explain that, to the extent that the
ITC needs to consider patent holdup in its public-interest analysis, the
ITC should determine whether the SEP holder has made a FRAND offer
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to the respondent. If the SEP holder has extended a FRAND offer, any
argument that the SEP holder is attempting to extract compensation
above the boundaries of its FRAND commitment becomes moot. It is ir-
relevant, for the purposes of the ITC investigation, why the respondent
failed to accept the SEP holder’s FRAND offer.
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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, a patent holder can pursue several remedies
against a patent infringer. Section 284 of the Patent Act provides that,
upon a finding of infringement, “the court shall award the claimant dam-
ages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less
than a reasonable royalty . . . .”1 In addition, § 283 provides that a court
“may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to
prevent the violation of any right secured by patent.”2 Section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930 also allows a patent holder to petition the U.S. Inter-
national Trade Commission (ITC)—a federal agency that investigates
matters of international trade and advises on international trade policy—
to issue an exclusion order against an infringer, a remedy that denies the
importation and sale in the United States of products that infringe a valid
and enforceable U.S. patent.3 In a case of patent infringement, a patent
holder may thus seek damages for the infringement, an injunction, and an
exclusion order.
The ITC has become a popular forum for enforcing intellectual
property rights, including standard-essential patents (SEPs).4 However,
as of October 2016, no SEP holder has been able to enforce an exclusion
order against products that infringed SEPs. Limits on the availability of
exclusion orders have arisen from concerns that exclusion orders would
facilitate patent holdup—that is, that the SEP holder would use an exclu-
sion order as a tool to force the potential licensee to accept a royalty that
exceeds the fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) range.5 In
1 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
2 Id. § 283.
3 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012).
4 See, e.g., NUMBER OF SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS INSTITUTED BY CALENDAR YEAR,
U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, http://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property/documents/cy_337_in
stitutions.pdf; see also Bert C. Reiser & Cyrus T. Frelinghuysen, An Overview of Section 337
Litigation Before the ITC, LAW360 (2010), http://www.law360.com/articles/183706/an-over
view-of-section-337-litigation-before-the-itc (“The ITC, however, has grown ever more popu-
lar as a forum for resolving intellectual property disputes, and the commission’s impact on
international trade has grown more pronounced.”).
5 See, e.g., Joseph Farrell, John Hayes, Carl Shapiro & Theresa Sullivan, Standard Set-
ting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603 (2007); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro,
Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007).
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August 2013, President Obama, acting through the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative (USTR), Michael Froman, echoed those concerns when he vetoed
the ITC’s exclusion order that was granted against products that in-
fringed SEPs on the grounds that the exclusion order would not serve the
public interest.6 Ambassador Froman said in that particular case that the
issuance of an exclusion order would harm U.S. consumers and the com-
petitive conditions of the U.S. economy.7 He instructed the ITC to ex-
amine, in future investigations, whether evidence of patent holdup or
holdout advises against the issuance of an exclusion order against a prod-
uct that infringes a FRAND-committed SEP.
A comprehensive analysis of the ITC’s patent decisions reveals that
the ITC entertained allegations of patent holdup and holdout in § 337
investigations even before President Obama’s veto. Furthermore, in at
least two investigations that followed President Obama’s veto, the ad-
ministrative law judge (ALJ) examined in detail allegations about the
SEP holder’s violation of its FRAND commitment, the asserted patent’s
essentiality, and patent holdup. However, in none of the investigations
has an ALJ found those allegations to be sufficiently supported by the
facts to weigh against the issuance of an exclusion order. Therefore, the
decisions adopted after President Obama’s veto show that an exclusion
order remains a remedy available against a product that infringes SEPs.
In this Article, I examine the evidence that should inform the ITC’s
decision of whether to issue an exclusion order against a product that
infringes FRAND-committed SEPs. To the extent that the ITC needs to
consider patent holdup in its public-interest analysis, the ITC should de-
termine whether the SEP holder has made a FRAND offer to the respon-
dent. If the SEP holder has extended a FRAND offer, any argument that
the SEP holder is attempting to extract compensation above the bounda-
ries of its FRAND commitment becomes moot. It is irrelevant, for the
purposes of the ITC investigation, why the respondent failed to accept
the SEP holder’s FRAND offer. Conversely, evidence that the SEP
holder made an offer above the FRAND range would support the conclu-
sion that the SEP holder attempted to hold up the respondent and, there-
fore, could advise against the issuance of an exclusion order. Because the
ITC has the statutory duty to issue an exclusion order unless public-inter-
est factors advise against such a remedy,8 it should be the respondent’s
burden to show that, in that specific case, the public interest in avoiding
patent holdup outweighs the benefits of issuing an exclusion order. There
6 Letter from Michael B.G. Froman, Ambassador, Exec. Office of the President, to Ir-
ving A. Williamson, Chairman, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n at 3 (Aug. 3, 2013), https://ustr.gov/
sites/default/files/08032013%20Letter_1.PDF [hereinafter Ambassador Froman’s Letter].
7 Id. at 1–3.
8 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2012).
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is no valid legal or economic reason to place that burden of proof on the
complainant in investigations concerning SEPs.
In Part I, I explain the procedure by which a patent holder may
petition the ITC for an exclusion order. In Part II, I analyze the available
remedies for a § 337 violation, and in Part III I examine their enforce-
ment. In Part IV, I analyze the ITC’s decisions in investigations directed
toward products that allegedly infringed FRAND-committed SEPs. I also
compare the ITC’s decisions before and after President Obama’s veto. In
Part V, I analyze the evidentiary standard that should inform the ITC’s
decisions, and the burden of proof that each party bears in presenting that
evidence.
I. EXCLUSION ORDERS UNDER § 337
The ITC has broad investigative powers in the five primary areas of
international trade: import injury investigations, intellectual-property-
based import investigations, industry and economic analysis, tariff and
trade information services, and trade policy support.9 Section 337 inves-
tigations thus fall under intellectual-property-based import
investigations.10
A. ITC Mandates and Responsibilities
The ITC grew from protectionist trade legislation in the early twen-
tieth century. The Tariff Act of 1930, also known as the Smoot-Hawley
Tariff Act, gave the ITC’s predecessor, the U.S. Tariff Commission, the
authority to investigate matters of international trade.11 The initial pur-
pose of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act was to protect domestic agriculture
from foreign competition—although, as enacted, the Act raised tariffs in
the industrial sector as well.12
Congress replaced the Tariff Commission with the ITC as part of
the Trade Reform Act of 1974.13 Pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution, Congress has the power to regulate trade.14 The Supreme
Court stated that, as a result of this power, “it necessarily follows that no
9 About the USITC, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/about
_usitc.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2016).
10 Intellectual Property, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, https://www.usitc.gov/intellectual
_property.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2016).
11 Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 337, 46 Stat. 703 (1930) (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. § 1337 (2012)).
12 Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC, 61
FLA. L. REV. 529, 541 (2009); Protectionism in the Interwar Period, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/protectionism.
13 Trade Reform Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1983 (1974) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337).
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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individual has a vested right to trade with foreign nations.”15 In other
words, there is no legal right to import into the United States. Whereas
the Tariff Commission had only advisory power, Congress granted the
ITC the power, under § 337, to declare certain practices in import trade
unlawful and to bar the importation of products that infringe a U.S. pat-
ent.16 Congress further empowered the ITC to bar the sale for importa-
tion of the infringing product and the sale of the offending product within
the United States after importation.17
In 1988, Congress enacted the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act,18 which broadened § 337’s scope. The 1988 legislation made it eas-
ier for a complainant to establish its case before the ITC in two ways,
both of which are examined in detail in Part I.C. First, Congress ended
the requirements that the complainant prove that the domestic industry
was “efficiently and economically operated” and that the importation of
infringing goods would “destroy or substantially injure” that industry.19
Second, Congress added § 337(a)(3), which allows the complainant to
establish the existence of the domestic industry by demonstrating that
there is, within the United States, “substantial investment in [the pat-
ent’s] exploitation, including engineering, research and development, or
licensing.”20 I analyze the ITC’s domestic industry requirement in
greater detail in Part I.C.
B. The ITC’s Expedited Docket and Mediation Program for § 337
Investigations
ITC § 337 investigations typically proceed more quickly than pat-
ent-infringement cases in federal district court. Moreover, in 2010, the
ITC instituted a mandatory mediation program to facilitate quicker, less
costly resolution of § 337 disputes through settlement.
The ITC will decide whether to investigate a case within thirty days
of the patent holder’s filing of a complaint.21 If the ITC decides to inves-
15 See Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 493 (1904); see also Sealed Air Corp. v.
U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 645 F.2d 976, 986 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (“The importer has no right to
complain as to the operation of the machinery, for the act of importation, even to our citizens,
is not a vested right, but an act of grace.” (quoting In re Orion Co., 71 F.2d 458, 465 (C.C.P.A.
1934) (internal citations omitted))).
16 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)–(D) (2012).
17 Id.
18 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2906 (2012)).
19 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1982) (repealed 1988).
20 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (2012).
21 U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS: ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS 16 (2009), http://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property/documents/
337_faqs.pdf [hereinafter 337 FAQs].
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tigate, which is the norm,22 it will publish a notice of investigation in the
Federal Register and serve a copy of the complaint and notice of investi-
gation to all named respondents. After the notice of investigation, the
ITC assigns an administrative law judge (ALJ) to preside over the hear-
ings.23 In addition, an investigative attorney from the ITC’s Office of
Unfair Import Investigations is assigned as a full party to the proceeding
and is responsible for representing the public interest.24
Within forty-five days of instituting the investigation, the ITC’s
ALJ must set a target date for the completion of the investigation, which
is typically twelve to fifteen months from its initiation.25 Patent infringe-
ment cases in the federal district courts might take five years.26 In con-
trast with the pace of complex commercial litigation in federal district
court, each task within the ITC proceeding takes place within a com-
pressed time frame. For example, discovery in the ITC usually occurs
within five to seven months of the filing of the complaint.27 Evidentiary
hearings in the ITC typically occur within seven months.28
In August 2010, the ITC instituted, as a permanent agency program,
a mediation program for § 337 investigations.29 The purpose of the medi-
ation program is to facilitate settlement by providing an “inexpensive,
confidential, and quick mechanism to evaluate whether settlement can be
achieved.”30 Even if the parties do not reach a settlement, they might
narrow issues and claims in the investigation during mediation.31 Private
parties in all § 337 cases are “eligible” to participate in the mediation
program,32 but, practically speaking, participation is mandatory at the
discretion of the ALJ—that is, the presiding ALJ may nominate a § 337
22 Id. (“Decisions not to institute an investigation are rare.”).
23 Id. at 1–2.
24 Id. at 2.
25 Id. at 20; see also Christopher A. Hughes & Michael P. Dougherty, Current Trends in
U.S. Patent Litigation: How to Succeed in “Rocket Docket” Courts, The ITC, and Arbitration,
THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO: PATENTS 2011, ch. 2, at 3 (Global Legal
Group Ltd. 2011).
26 See Gilbert B. Kaplan & Courtland Reichman, The ITC or the District Court? Where
to Protect Your International Intellectual Property, 10 BRIEFLY, Nov. 2006, at 1.
27 Id.
28 See Russell E. Levine, The Benefits of Using the ITC, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Sept.
2004, at 27–28, http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/kirkexp/publications/2386/Document1/Le
vine_MIP.pdf.
29 U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, USER MANUAL FOR COMMISSION MEDIATION PROGRAM
FOR SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS, https://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property/documents/
Manual_for_Commission_Mediation_Program_337.pdf [hereinafter ITC MEDIATION PRO-
GRAM USER MANUAL].
30 U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, SECTION 337 MEDIATION PROGRAM, Pub. No. 4579, at 3
(Nov. 2015), https://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property/documents/mediation_brochure_pub
4579_2015_final.pdf [hereinafter ITC MEDIATION PROGRAM] .
31 ITC MEDIATION PROGRAM USER MANUAL, supra note 29, at 9. R
32 Id. at 7.
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case for inclusion in the mediation program.33 The Secretary to the Com-
mission, who works with the mediator to conduct a settlement confer-
ence, coordinates the program.34 The mediators, who serve on a pro bono
basis and have been approved by the ITC, are outside experts and consul-
tants with experience in both patent litigation and mediation.35
Upon filing a complaint, each complainant and respondent receives
materials explaining the mediation program.36 Private parties to a § 337
dispute may request participation in the program by filing a Confidential
Request to Enter Mediation, copies of which are served on all private
parties.37 The presiding ALJ may refer § 337 investigations to the Secre-
tary to the Commission, who may discuss the possibility of mediation
with the parties involved. The ALJ may also require attendance by par-
ties at mediation sessions.38 If the mediator concludes that further media-
tion efforts “will not be fruitful,” then the mediation ceases.39 The ITC
typically expects mediations to take one day. In fact, mandatory attend-
ance by a party at a mediation session may not exceed a single day.40
Unlike in arbitration, a settlement agreement, which is binding on all
parties, can be achieved “only if all parties agree on that resolution.”41
Upon reaching a settlement, the parties must jointly file a motion for
termination of the investigation based on the settlement agreement or
seek a consent order regarding termination.42
C. Elements to Establish a § 337 Claim
Section 337(a)(1)(B) prohibits “the importation into the United
States, the sale for importation, and the sale within the United States after
importation . . . of articles that infringe a valid and enforceable United
States patent.”43 For a complainant to bring a successful § 337 claim
before the ITC, the complainant must establish (1) infringement of a pat-
ent under Title 35 of the U.S. Code, (2) the importation of the allegedly
infringing product, and (3) the existence of a domestic industry related to
the product that is protected by the patent.44
33 ITC MEDIATION PROGRAM, supra note 30, at 5. R
34 Id.
35 Id. at 8.
36 Id. at 7.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 7–8 (pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 556(c)(6), (8) (2012)).
39 Id. at 9.
40 Id. at 8 n.1.
41 Id. at 10.
42 Id.
43 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (2012).
44 Id. § 1337(a)(1)–(2).
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The standard to establish patent infringement in the ITC is the same
standard as in federal district court.45 Section 271 defines a patent in-
fringer as one who “without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells
any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent there-
for,” as well as one who “actively induces” the infringement of a
patent.46
To satisfy § 337’s importation requirement, the complainant must
prove “the importation into the United States, the sale for importation, or
the sale within the United States after importation by the owner, im-
porter, or consignee” of the infringing product.47 The importation re-
quirement is “not limit[ed] ‘to . . . the actual physical process of
importation.’”48 As long as there is a connection to importation, the im-
portation requirement is satisfied. Moreover, there is no minimum quan-
tity of infringing products that must be imported into the United States to
meet the importation requirement.49 Although the infringing product
must be imported, a foreign firm need not produce it to be investigated
by the ITC. Thus, because the ITC considers the location of the product
in question instead of the location of the respondent, a patent holder may
pursue claims against multiple entities from all over the world in a single
ITC investigation as long as the infringing product has been imported.
Section 337(a)(2) provides that the prohibition on importation ap-
plies “only if an industry in the United States, relating to the articles
protected by the patent . . . exists or is in the process of being estab-
lished.”50 Therefore, in addition to proving that the imported products
infringe a valid and enforceable U.S. patent, the complainant must show
the existence of a domestic industry related to the patent in suit. Section
337(a)(3) clarifies that a U.S. industry exists if there are (1) significant
investments in plant and equipment, (2) significant employment of labor
or capital, or (3) substantial investment in the exploitation of the patent,
including investments in engineering, research and development, or li-
45 See, e.g., Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., 231 F.3d 1325, 1330 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (“In section 337 proceedings relevant to patent infringement, the ITC follows Title 35 of
the United States Code and the case law of this court.”).
46 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)–(b) (2012).
47 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (2012).
48 Kaplan & Reichman, supra note 26, at 41–42 (quoting Welded Stainless Steel Pipe & R
Tube, Inv. No. 337-TA-29, 1978 WL 50692, at *8 (USITC Feb. 22, 1978) (Final)). Kaplan and
Reichman review several ITC determinations, illustrating the broad coverage of the importa-
tion requirement. See id. at 41–43.
49 Jamie D. Underwood & Ian A. Taronji, ITC Exclusion Is Better Than Litigation: Swift
Action, Sweeping Remedies, EXECUTIVE COUNSEL, Jan.–Feb. 2008, at 1.
50 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2) (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\26-1\CJP104.txt unknown Seq: 10 13-DEC-16 13:24
134 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 26:125
censing.51 The complainant needs to satisfy only one of these criteria to
prove the existence of a domestic industry.52
D. The ITC’s Discretion in Issuing an Exclusion Order
In deciding whether to issue an exclusion order, the ITC follows a
two-step process. First, the ITC must determine whether there is a viola-
tion of § 337. In doing so, the ITC must examine the requirements ana-
lyzed in Part I.C. In addition, § 337(c) affords the respondent the
opportunity to raise “[a]ll legal and equitable defenses” during the ITC’s
determination of whether the respondent has violated § 337.53 Congress
adopted this defense provision in 1975 after observing that “the ultimate
issue of the fairness of competition raised by section 337[ ] necessitate[s]
that the Commission review the validity and enforceability of patents, for
the purposes of section 337, in accordance with contemporary legal stan-
dards.”54 Because § 337 requires that the U.S. patent be both valid and
enforceable,55 the ITC will conclude that there is no violation of § 337 if
the respondent presents sufficient evidence that the patent is not valid or
not enforceable.56 For example, the respondent could argue that the pat-
ent is unenforceable because there exists an implied license for the patent
in suit.57 Similarly, the respondent could present a defense of patent ex-
haustion—a doctrine that determines that “the initial authorized sale of a
patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.”58 Therefore, the
defense provision of § 337(c) allows the respondent to raise any equita-
51 For a detailed analysis of the criteria to establish the existence of a domestic industry,
see J. Gregory Sidak, Economic Analysis of the Existence of a Domestic Industry in Sec-
tion 337 Patent Infringement Cases at the U.S. International Trade Commission, 2 CRITERION
J. ON INNOVATION (forthcoming 2017), https://www.criterioneconomics.com/economic-theory-
of-investment-domestic-industry-requirement-itc.html.
52 Id.; see also AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW, A LAWYER’S
GUIDE TO SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS BEFORE THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMIS-
SION 55 (Tom M. Schaumberg ed., 3d ed. 2016).
53 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2012).
54 S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 196 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186, 7329 (em-
phasis added).
55 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(B)(i) (2012).
56 See, e.g., Certain Personal Computers & Digital Display Devices, Inv. No. 337-TA-
606, 2008 WL 2740242, at *1 (USITC Jan. 25, 2008) (Order No. 24: Denying Acer’s Motion
for Summary Determination Regarding the ‘119 Patent) (“[R]espondents . . . moved for sum-
mary determination that there is no violation of Section 337 based upon . . . [complainant’s]
covenant not to sue.”).
57 Certain Dynamic Random Access Memory Devices & Prods. Containing Same, Inv.
No. 337-TA-595, 2008 WL 164309, at *2 (USITC Jan. 14, 2008) (Order No. 16: Denying
Complainant’s Motion for Partial Summary Determination on Respondents’ Second, Third,
Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Affirmative Defense).
58 Certain Consumer Electronics with Display & Processing Capabilities, Inv. No. 337-
TA-619, 2014 WL 1649089, at *3 (USITC Apr. 4, 2014) (Order No. 76: Denying Motion for
Summary Determination as to Accused Products; and Denying Related Motion to Strike)
(quoting Tessera, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 646 F.3d 1357, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
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ble and legal defense that it could also raise in a patent infringement
lawsuit to show that the asserted patent is invalid and unenforceable.
However, if the ITC finds a violation of § 337, it must act. The ITC
shall direct that the articles concerned . . . be excluded
from entry in the United States, unless, after considering
the effect of such exclusion upon the public health and
welfare, competitive conditions in the United States
economy, the production of like or directly competitive
articles in the United States, and United States consum-
ers, it finds that such articles should not be excluded
from entry.59
The Federal Circuit has emphasized that “the use of ‘shall’ in a statue is
‘the language of command.’”60 That is, “[b]y statute, the Commission is
required to issue an exclusion order upon finding a § 337 violation, ab-
sent a finding that the effects of one of the statutorily-enumerated public-
interest factors counsel otherwise.”61 Put differently, the ITC must issue
an exclusion order if it finds a violation of § 337, unless the effect of the
exclusion order on the statutory public-interest factors—public health
and welfare, U.S. competitive conditions, the production of competitive
articles, and U.S. consumers—outweighs the benefits of the exclusion
order.
As of October 2016, the ITC has found on only three occasions that
the public-interest considerations outweighed the benefits of issuing an
exclusion order.62 The Federal Circuit observed that, in the few cases in
which the ITC denied an exclusion order upon finding infringement, the
ITC did so because it concluded that “an exclusion order would deprive
the public of products necessary for some important health or welfare
need: energy efficient automobiles, basic scientific research, or hospital
equipment.”63 Put differently, unless an exclusion order would pose “a
59 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012) (emphasis added).
60 Farrel Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 949 F.2d 1147, 1153 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing
Ass’n of Am. R.R. v. Costle, 562 F.2d 1310, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
61 Spansion, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(emphasis added).
62 Certain Fluidized Supporting Apparatus & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-
182/188, Pub. 1667, 1984 WL 63741 (USITC Oct. 1, 1984) (Final); Certain Inclined-Field
Acceleration Tubes & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-67, Pub. 1119, 0080 WL
594319 (USITC Dec. 1, 1980) (Final); Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-
TA-60, Pub. 1022, 0079 WL 419349 (USITC Dec. 1, 1979) (Final); see also P. Andrew Riley
& Scott A. Allen, The Public Interest Inquiry for Permanent Injunctions or Exclusion Orders:
Shedding the Myopic Lens, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 751, 759–62 (2015).
63 Spansion, 629 F.3d at 1360 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
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real threat to the best interests of the country,” the ITC will issue an
exclusion order upon finding a § 337 violation.64
II. AVAILABLE REMEDIES FOR A VIOLATION OF § 337
When the ITC finds a violation of § 337, it has three remedies at its
disposal: it may issue a limited exclusion order, a general exclusion or-
der, or a cease-and-desist order. An exclusion order is an in rem remedy,
meaning that it is directed at the infringing input, not at the particular
respondent. Section 337(d)(1) states that the ITC “shall direct that the
articles concerned . . . be excluded from entry.”65 The Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (the predecessor to the Federal Circuit) stated that
“[a]n exclusion order operates against goods, not parties.”66 Conse-
quently, the ITC does not need personal jurisdiction over the respondent
to issue an exclusion order.67 A cease-and-desist order, by contrast, is an
in personam remedy that is directed at the respondent. Section 337(f)(1)
states that the ITC “may issue and cause to be served on any person” a
cease-and-desist order.68 The Federal Circuit has confirmed that the ITC
“may issue cease and desist orders when it has personal jurisdiction over
the party against whom the order is directed.”69
A. Limited Exclusion Orders
A limited exclusion order prohibits named respondents, including
manufacturers of the infringing input and downstream products, from im-
porting the infringing input (and downstream products) into the United
States.70 Although the remedy has a similar effect as an injunction that a
court may issue in a patent infringement case, a limited exclusion order
pursues a fundamentally different goal. Section 283 of the Patent Act
provides a court the authority to grant an injunction “to prevent the viola-
tion of any right secured by patent.”71 By issuing an injunction, a court
aims to protect the patent holder’s patent rights. Conversely, the purpose
of an ITC remedy is to protect U.S. domestic industry and trade, not to
protect the patent holder.72 The ITC does not administer the Patent Act.
64 Certain Wireless Devices with 3G and/or 4G Capabilities & Components Thereof,
Inv. No. 337-TA-868, Pub. 2929, 2014 WL 2965327, at *113 (USITC June 13, 2014) (Initial).
65 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
66 Sealed Air Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 645 F.2d 976, 985 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
67 Id. (stating that an exclusion order is “not contingent” upon a determination of per-
sonal jurisdiction).
68 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
69 Gamut Trading Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 200 F.3d 775, 784 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
70 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2012).
71 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1952).
72 See, e.g., Elizabeth I. Winston, Patent Pledges at the International Trade Commission,
in PATENT PLEDGES—GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON PATENT LAW’S PRIVATE ORDERING FRONTIER
(Jorge L. Contreras & Meredith Jacob eds., forthcoming 2017).
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The ITC is a federal agency with “investigative responsibilities on mat-
ters of trade.”73 Consequently, it administers trade remedies, and not
remedies for patent infringement.74
Included in the ITC’s power to issue an exclusion order is the au-
thority to issue a temporary exclusion order under the same standard that
the federal district courts use in issuing a preliminary injunction.75 The
Federal Circuit stated in Rosemount, Inc. v. ITC that § 337 “requires that
the exercise of its temporary relief authority should generally parallel
that of the district courts.”76 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit cited the
following factors that district courts, and therefore the ITC as well, ought
to consider when granting preliminary relief:
(1) the movant’s likelihood of success on the merits; (2)
whether or not the movant will suffer irreparable injury
during the pendency of the litigation if the preliminary
injunction is not granted; (3) whether or not that injury
outweighs the harm to other parties if the preliminary
injunction is issued; and (4) whether the grant or denial
of the preliminary injunction is in the public interest.77
If the ITC issues a temporary exclusion order, it remains in effect during
the course of the investigation, as does a preliminary injunction in federal
district court.
B. General Exclusion Orders
A general exclusion order prohibits any party, including parties not
named as respondents in the ITC’s investigation, from importing a prod-
uct containing the infringing input into the United States.78 The general
exclusion order has no counterpart in federal district court, as an injunc-
tion applies only to named parties.
To issue a general exclusion order, the ITC must find that such an
order “is necessary to prevent circumvention of [a limited exclusion or-
der]” or that “there is a pattern of violation . . . and it is difficult to
identify the source of infringing products.”79 These statutory require-
ments raise the bar for complainants to obtain general exclusion orders.80
73 About the USITC, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/
about_usitc.htm.
74 See id.
75 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e)(3) (2012) (“The Commission may grant preliminary relief . . . to
the same extent as preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders may be granted
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
76 Rosemount, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 910 F.2d 819, 821 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
77 Id. (citing Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Grip-Pak, Inc., 906 F.2d 679, 681 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
78 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2) (2012).
79 Id.
80 See Kaplan & Reichman, supra note 26, at 47. R
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In Certain Inkjet Ink Supplies & Components Thereof, the ALJ issued a
general exclusion order that barred the importation of any products that
infringed four inkjet patents held by Hewlett-Packard.81 The ALJ noted
the “widespread pattern of unauthorized use” by the respondents, as well
as the difficulty in identifying the sources of the infringing products.82
The ALJ also stated that some of the respondents “engaged in tactics that
make it difficult to identify the true source of the online sale and/or dis-
tribution of infringing activities, including creating multiple websites and
corporate identities.”83 The ITC affirmed the issuance of the general ex-
clusion order.84
C. Cease-and-Desist Orders
The ITC may issue a cease-and-desist order as a sole remedy or in
conjunction with an exclusion order.85 A cease-and-desist order prohibits
the sale of further units of an infringing input that are already in inven-
tory in the United States at the time of the ITC’s decision.86 The ITC
generally issues a cease-and-desist order to a respondent having a “com-
mercially significant” domestic inventory, to prevent the respondent
from flooding the market with products containing the infringing input
that are already in inventory, thereby undermining the effect of an exclu-
sion order.87 By the same reasoning, in Texas Instruments Inc. v. ITC, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC’s issuance of a cease-and-desist order in
conjunction with a limited exclusion order.88 The limited exclusion order
prohibited respondents from importing the infringing product into the
United States, and the cease-and-desist order prohibited the respondents
from selling their domestic inventory.89 If a respondent has no domestic
inventory, however, a cease-and-desist order would be ineffective to
remedy the patent infringement. For example, in Fuji Photo Film Co. v.
ITC, the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the ITC not to issue a
cease-and-desist order against certain respondents because they did not
maintain any inventory in the United States.90 The ITC (and subse-
81 Certain Inkjet Ink Supplies & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-691, 2010 WL
5586103, at *20–21 (USITC Aug. 30, 2010) (Initial).
82 Id. at *17–18.
83 Id. at *18.
84 Certain Inkjet Ink Supplies & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-691, Pub. 4290,
2011 WL 7464367, at *1–3 (USITC Nov. 1, 2011) (Final).
85 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(1) (2012).
86 Id.
87 See, e.g., Certain Lens-Fitted Film Packages, Inv. No. 337-TA-406, Pub. 3219, 1999
WL 731020, at *16–17 (USITC June 2, 1999) (Final), rev’d on other grounds, Jazz Photo
Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Underwood & Taronji,
supra note 49. R
88 988 F.2d 1165, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
89 Id. at 1169.
90 386 F.3d. 1095, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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quently the Federal Circuit) found that under those circumstances, a gen-
eral exclusion order was sufficient.91
D. Exclusion Order Bonds
The ITC may require a party to post two types of bonds when the
agency issues an exclusion order. First, under § 337(e)(2), the ITC may
require a complainant to post a bond as a prerequisite to receiving a tem-
porary exclusion order.92 This type of bond is identical to an injunction
bond that a federal district court may require a patent holder to post as a
prerequisite to receiving a preliminary injunction. Second, under
§ 337(e)(1) and § 337(j)(3), a respondent found liable for patent infringe-
ment may continue to import the infringing input during the sixty-day
presidential review period if the respondent posts a bond.93
According to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which the ITC follows in issuing preliminary relief,94 the ITC may grant
a temporary exclusion order “only if” the complainant gives security
(that is, posts an injunction bond) in an amount that the ITC deems
proper to compensate the respondent if it is wrongfully enjoined by the
temporary exclusion order.95 When a complainant moves for a temporary
exclusion order, it must address whether it should be required to post a
bond and, if it believes that it should, it must specify the appropriate
amount of the bond.96 Likewise, when the respondent files its response to
the complainant’s motion for temporary relief, it must address the com-
plainant’s assertions as to whether a bond should be required and the
appropriate amount of the bond.97 Typically, the complainant will argue
that it should not be required to post a bond, but if it is required to do so,
that the bond amount should be minimal.98 Conversely, the respondent
will contend that the ITC should require the complainant to post a signif-
icant bond if the ITC grants preliminary relief.99 If the ITC requires the
complainant to post a bond, the complainant must submit the bond within
the period specified by the ITC. Otherwise, the ITC will not issue the
temporary exclusion order.100 If the ITC later determines that the respon-
dent did not violate § 337, then the respondent may move for a hearing
91 Id.
92 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e)(2) (2012).
93 Id. § 1337(e)(1) & (j)(3).
94 See id. § 1337(e)(3).
95 FED R. CIV. P. 65(c).
96 19 C.F.R. § 210.52(b) (2015).
97 Id. § 210.59(a)–(b).
98 See, e.g., Certain Silicon Microphone Packages & Prods. Containing the Same, Inv.
No. 337-TA-695, Pub. 4293, 2011 WL 7575648, at *200–01 (USITC Nov. 1, 2011) (Initial).
99 See, e.g., id.
100 19 C.F.R. § 210.68 (2015).
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to determine whether the complainant’s bond should be forfeited to the
respondent.101
After the ITC has issued an exclusion order, the ITC will permit the
respondent to import the infringing input into the United States during
the presidential review period, provided that the respondent posts a bond
“sufficient to protect the complainant from any injury”102 during the
presidential review period.103 Under § 337(j)(3), after the issuance of an
exclusion order and “until such determination becomes final”—that is,
until the presidential review period expires—the respondent is “entitled
to entry under bond.”104 When the determination becomes final, the bond
is then forfeited to the complainant.105 In Certain Semiconductor Chips
Having Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory Controllers &
Products Containing Same, the ALJ recommended a limited exclusion
order, a cease-and-desist order, and a bond set “at a reasonable royalty
rate during the Presidential review period.”106 The ITC affirmed the lim-
ited exclusion order and cease-and-desist order and specified that the
amount of the bond would be “2.65[%] of the entered value of accused
products” during the presidential review period.107 The ITC noted that
the complainant had not established the need for a higher bond rate to
protect it from injury.108 In contrast, in Certain Inkjet Ink Supplies &
Components Thereof, upon the issuance of a general exclusion order, the
ALJ set the bond amount at 100% of the price “differential between the
domestic product and the imported, infringing product.”109 Because none
of the respondents participated in discovery, the ALJ found “insufficient
reliable price information to set a bond based on price differential,” and
he therefore recommended a bond amount of 100%,110 which the ITC
affirmed.111
101 Id. § 210.70.
102 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e)(1) (2012).
103 See Certain Mobile Tels. & Wireless Commc’ns Devices Featuring Digital Cameras,
& Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-663, 2009 WL 6037686, at *1 n.2 (USITC Dec. 23,
2009) (ALJ’s Recommended Determination on Remedy & Bonding).
104 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j)(3) (2012).
105 Id.
106 Certain Semiconductor Chips Having Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Mem-
ory Controllers & Prods. Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-661, Pub. 4266, 2010 WL
3196463, at *1 (USITC Aug. 10, 2010) (Final) (internal quotation marks omitted).
107 Id. at *9.
108 Id.
109 Certain Inkjet Ink Supplies & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-691, 2010 WL
5586103, at *20 (USITC Aug. 30, 2010) (Initial) (citing Certain Microsphere Adhesives,
Processes for Making Same, & Prods. Containing Same at 24, Including Self-Stick Reposition-
able Notes, Inv. No. 337-TA-336 (1995) (Final)).
110 Id.
111 See Certain Inkjet Ink Supplies & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-691, Pub.
4290, 2011 WL 7464367, at *1–3 (USITC Nov. 1, 2011) (Final).
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III. ENFORCEMENT OF REMEDIES
ITC determinations that find a violation of § 337 are subject to pres-
idential review.112 Any party affected by the ITC’s determination may
also appeal the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, which has appellate jurisdiction over the ITC’s
determinations.113
A. Presidential Review
Within sixty days of receiving the ITC’s determination, the Presi-
dent, “for policy reasons,” may disapprove of the determination, in
which case the ITC’s determination will have “no force or effect.”114 If
the President does not exercise this power, the ITC’s determination be-
comes final after sixty days, at which point the parties then have sixty
days in which to appeal an unfavorable decision to the Federal Circuit.115
Presidential review is, nonetheless, exceedingly rare. The President has
reviewed an ITC § 337 determination only six times since the creation of
the ITC.116 President Carter issued the first presidential disapproval,
President Reagan issued the next four, and President Obama issued the
most recent disapproval.117 Reagan disapproved of the ITC’s issuance of
a limited exclusion order that applied to downstream products in addition
to the infringing input because it could unnecessarily disrupt trade in the
downstream products.118 Reagan’s disapproval suggested that the ITC
should have issued a narrower remedy.119 Reagan’s 1981 disapproval in
Certain Multi-Ply Headboxes was based on similar grounds and stated
112 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j)(2) (2012).
113 Id. § 1337(c) (“[A]ny person adversely affected by a final determination of the Com-
mission . . . may appeal such determination . . . to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.”).
114 Id. § 1337(j)(2).
115 337 FAQs, supra note 21, at 26. R
116 See, e.g., Ambassador Froman’s Letter, supra note 6; Presidential Disapproval of De- R
termination of the U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Certain Dynamic Random Access Memories,
USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-242, 52 Fed. Reg. 46,011 (Dec. 3, 1987) [hereinafter Presidential
Disapproval of Certain Dynamic Random Access Memories]; Presidential Disapproval of De-
termination of the U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Certain Alkaline Batteries, USITC Inv. No. 337-
TA-165, 50 Fed. Reg. 1655 (Jan. 11, 1985); Presidential Disapproval of Determination of the
U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Certain Molded-In Sandwich Panel Inserts, USITC Inv. No. 337-
TA-99, 47 Fed. Reg. 29,919 (July 9, 1982); Presidential Disapproval of Determination of the
U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Certain Multi-Ply Headboxes, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-82, 46 Fed.
Reg. 32,361 (June 22, 1981) [hereinafter Presidential Disapproval of Certain Multi-Ply
Headboxes]; Presidential Disapproval of Determination of the U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n
Welded Stainless Steel Pipe & Tubes, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-29, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,789 (Apr.
26, 1978).
117 See supra note 116. R
118 See Presidential Disapproval of Certain Dynamic Random Access Memories, supra
note 116. R
119 Id.
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that the general exclusion order issued by the ITC was too broad, but that
“[a]n exclusion order directed only to the respondent’s products, or a
narrowly drafted cease and desist order would appear to be entirely justi-
fied and appropriate.”120
B. Enforcement, Stays, and Appeals
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) enforces exclusion or-
ders issued by the ITC and bars entry of infringing articles into the
United States.121 It can be burdensome for CBP to detect an infringing
input in a product that includes many components. In such a case, the
ITC may, and often does, include in an exclusion order a provision that
authorizes CBP to accept sworn certification by importers that their im-
ported products are not subject to the exclusion order.122 When respon-
dents redesign their excluded products after the ITC’s issuance of an
exclusion order, the ITC or CBP must determine whether the redesigned
products fall outside the scope of the exclusion order. Until CBP or the
ITC has determined that the redesigned products are non-infringing,
those products are barred from importation.123 Respondents, importers,
or third parties can request either a non-binding ruling from CBP that
their redesigned products fall outside the scope of the exclusion order124
or an advisory opinion from the ITC that their redesigned products are
non-infringing and hence not subject to the exclusion order.125 To avoid
delay in obtaining an ITC advisory opinion on the importation of a rede-
signed product, the respondent may submit to the ITC its redesigned
product during the § 337 investigation.126
The ITC itself enforces cease-and-desist orders. When a party vio-
lates a cease-and-desist order, the ITC issues a fine, recoverable through
120 Kaplan & Reichman, supra note 26, at 30 n.68 (quoting Presidential Disapproval of R
Certain Multi-Ply Headboxes, supra note 116). R
121 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (2012).
122 See Michael J. McKeon, Jeffrey R. Whieldon & Joshua B. Pond, ITC Update: Reme-
dies, Enforcement & Other Developments, Presented at the IPO Annual Meeting, at 22 (Sept.
12–14, 2010).
123 See, e.g., Eaton Corp. v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1319 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2005); Certain Hardware Logic Emulation Systems & Components Thereof at 16–17, Inv. No.
337-TA-383, USITC Pub. 3154 (Mar. 31, 1998) (Opinion on Remedy, the Public Interest, and
Bonding); INTELLECTUAL PROP. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, 2010 JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 10 (2010); see also Steven E. Adkins & John
Evans, “Several Healthy Steps Away”: New & Improved Products in Section 337 Investiga-
tions, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 309 (2009).
124 See McKeon, Whieldon & Pond, supra note 122, at 21. R
125 19 C.F.R. § 210.79(a) (2010).
126 See McKeon, Whieldon & Pond, supra note 122, at 20–21; Steven E. Adkins, US ITC: R
Use Redesigns to Win at the ITC, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Oct. 1, 2010, http://www.mana
gingip.com/Article/2679363/Supplements/US-ITC-Use-redesigns-to-win-at-the-ITC.html?Ar
ticleId=2679363& supplementListId=78381&p=3.
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litigation in federal district court, of no more than the greater of $100,000
or twice the domestic value of the violating good for each day that the
good is imported into or sold within the United States.127 In contrast, the
plaintiff in a federal district court case bears the burden of detecting the
defendant’s violation of an injunction.
By statute, § 337 decisions and federal district court decisions on
patent infringement are both appealed exclusively to the Federal Cir-
cuit.128 Upon the ITC’s issuance of an exclusion order, the respondent
may petition the Federal Circuit to stay the remedial order, just as a de-
fendant may seek a stay of an injunction issued in federal district
court.129 In addition, the respondent may petition the ITC to stay the
exclusion order under section 705 of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), which states that, “[w]hen an agency finds that justice so re-
quires, it may postpone the effective date of action taken by it, pending
judicial review.”130 However, the requirements for a stay are generally
difficult to establish. The ITC stated in a 2009 decision that, “[i]n deter-
mining whether to grant a motion for a stay under section 705 of the
APA, the Commission has applied the four-prong test used by courts to
determine whether to grant a preliminary injunction.”131 Consequently,
in Certain Semiconductor Chips with Minimized Chip Package Size &
Products Containing the Same, the ITC applied the following four fac-
tors in determining whether to grant the stay: “(1) a likelihood of success
on the merits of the appeal; (2) irreparable harm to the movant absent a
stay; (3) that the issuance of a stay would not substantially harm other
parties; and (4) that the public interest favors a stay.”132 Based on these
factors, the ITC denied the respondents’ motion to stay a limited exclu-
sion order and a cease-and-desist order pending appeal to the Federal
Circuit.133
When reviewing ITC decisions on appeal, the Federal Circuit uses a
more deferential standard of review than it does for district court deci-
sions because the APA governs the ITC. The Federal Circuit reviews the
ITC’s findings of fact supporting its issuance of an exclusion order under
the “substantial evidence” standard, which requires “such relevant evi-
dence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclu-
127 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(2) (2012).
128 Id. § 1337(c); 35 U.S.C. § 141 (2012).
129 See, e.g., Jazz Photo Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1098 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (lifting the stay of a general exclusion order and a cease-and-desist order); see also
FED. R. APP. P. 8(a).
130 5 U.S.C. § 705 (2012).
131 Certain Semiconductor Chips with Minimized Chip Package Size & Prods. Containing
the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-605, 2009 WL 2350644, at *2 (USITC July 29, 2009) (citing
Standard Havens Prods. Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 897 F.2d 511, 512 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
132 Id.
133 Id. at *6.
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sion.”134 However, the Federal Circuit will not disturb the ITC’s
interpretation of law unless the ITC’s decision was “arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the statute.”135 The ITC’s interpretations of
§ 337 receive Chevron deference in the Federal Circuit.136 The Chevron
standard is a two-step process. First, the reviewing court determines
“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at is-
sue.”137 If so, then the reviewing court (and the agency) “must give ef-
fect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”138
Alternatively, if the statute is “silent or ambiguous” on the matter, then
the reviewing court determines “whether the agency’s answer is based on
a permissible construction of the statute.”139 If the statute is silent (or
ambiguous) on the matter, then the reviewing court will not disturb the
agency’s determination unless it meets the “arbitrary and capricious”
standard set forth in section 706 of the APA, which is the highest level of
deference that reviewing courts accord to lower decisions.
In contrast, when reviewing federal district court decisions, the Fed-
eral Circuit reviews questions of fact for clear error140 and questions of
law under a de novo standard of review.141 The Supreme Court’s 1996
decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. heightened the differ-
ence in the Federal Circuit’s standards of review when reviewing issues
of claims construction of the ITC and the federal district courts.142 In
Markman, the Supreme Court held that the construction of a patent, in-
cluding interpretation of the language of the patent holder’s claim, is a
matter of law to be decided by the judge.143 For example, in Generation
II Orthotics Inc. v. Medical Technology Inc., the Federal Circuit deter-
mined whether the language in a patent that applied to orthopedic braces
included dynamic control throughout the range of motion of the brace
arm.144 Because the construction of a patent claim is a matter of law, the
134 Enercon GmbH v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 151 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
135 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 831, 844 (1984); see
also Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
136 See, e.g., Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1355
(Fed. Cir. 2008); Enercon GmbH, 151 F.3d at 1381.
137 Kyocera, 545 F.3d at 1355 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. 120, 132 (2000)).
138 Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
139 Enercon GmbH, 151 F.3d at 1381 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
140 See SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(citing Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
141 See Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed Cir. 2010).
142 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
143 Id. at 372.
144 263 F.3d 1356, 1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (construing the claim concerning “joint
means in the brace for allowing controlled medial and lateral inclination of each arm relative
to the pivotable joint”).
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Federal Circuit reviews claims constructions under a de novo stan-
dard.145 Thus, the Federal Circuit gives no deference to the decisions of
the federal district courts on claims constructions. In the 2010 case Trad-
ing Technologies International v. eSpeed, Inc., the Federal Circuit stated
that it “requires a review of the district court’s claim construction with-
out the slightest iota of deference.”146 Thus, on appeal, the Federal Cir-
cuit accords considerably more deference to decisions of the ITC than it
does to decisions of the federal district courts. “It was the intent of Con-
gress,” the Federal Circuit stated, “that greater weight and finality be
accorded to the Commission’s findings as compared with those of the
trial court.”147
IV. EXCLUSION ORDERS FOR SEPS BEFORE AND AFTER PRESIDENT
OBAMA’S VETO IN THE APPLE-SAMSUNG DISPUTE
An SEP holder, like any other patent holder, has the right to file a
complaint with the ITC for a violation of § 337 of the Tariff Act. How-
ever, as of October 2016, the ITC had issued only one exclusion order
against products that infringed SEPs, and President Obama ultimately
vetoed that order.148 He vetoed that exclusion order largely because of
concerns that excluding from importation products that infringe SEPs
could enable patent holdup. When he vetoed the ITC’s exclusion order
against products found to infringe SEPs, Ambassador Froman explicitly
instructed the ITC to examine, in its future public-interest analysis, evi-
dence of patent holdup or patent holdout. However, a detailed analysis of
past § 337 investigations shows that, even before President Obama’s
veto, the ITC did examine allegations about SEP holders’ opportunism; it
found those allegations unsubstantiated and, consequently, insufficient to
advise against the issuance of an exclusion order. Following President
Obama’s veto, the ALJs’ decisions have included a more detailed analy-
sis of patent holdup and patent holdout. However, even in those investi-
gations, the ALJs have not found such allegations sufficiently persuasive
to advise against the issuance of an exclusion order.
A. Concerns That an Exclusion Order Might Facilitate Holdup
In 2012, several public agencies began expressing concerns with the
issuance of exclusion orders against products that infringe SEPs. In 2012,
145 Trading Techs., 595 F.3d at 1350.
146 Id. at 1351 (citing Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir.
1998)).
147 Tandon Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 831 F.2d 1017, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(citing S. REP. NO. 466, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1979)).
148 Certain Electronic Devices, Including Wireless Communication Devices, Portable
Music & Data Processing Devices, & Tablet Computers at 119, Inv. No. 337-TA-794, Pub.
2824 (USITC July 5, 2013) (Final) [hereinafter USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-794 Final].
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in a statement of public interest submitted in Certain Wireless Communi-
cation Devices, Portable Music and Data Processing Devices, Com-
puters and Components Thereof, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
said that the issuance of an exclusion order might facilitate patent
holdup.149 The FTC claimed that a patent holder could “seek an exclu-
sion order for infringement of the [F]RAND-encumbered SEP as a way
of securing royalties that may be inconsistent with that [F]RAND com-
mitment.”150 The FTC opined that holdup, as well as the mere threat of
holdup, would harm consumers by deterring innovation and reducing the
value of standard-setting activities.151 To mitigate that harm, the FTC
stated that the ITC “could find that Section 337’s public-interest factors
support denial of an exclusion order” unless the SEP holder had made a
reasonable license offer to the potential licensee.152
In January 2013, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)—despite
having no authority over the ITC’s decision to grant an exclusion or-
der—submitted a joint policy statement expressing concerns similar to
those that the FTC raised in its public-interest statement.153 The Antitrust
Division and the USPTO said that an SEP holder might use the threat of
an exclusion order “to pressure an implementer . . . to accept more oner-
ous licensing terms than the patent holder would be entitled to receive
consistent with the F/RAND commitment.”154 They argued that, in such
circumstances, an exclusion order “may harm competition and consum-
ers by degrading one of the tools [that standard-setting organizations]
employ to mitigate the threat of such opportunistic action.”155 The Anti-
trust Division and the USPTO suggested that, if the SEP holder is at-
tempting to engage in patent holdup, the ITC might conclude that the
public-interest factors advise against an exclusion order.156 They also
suggested that, in some circumstances, the ITC might find it appropriate
to delay the effective date of an exclusion order “to provide parties the
opportunity to conclude a F/RAND license.”157
149 Third Party U.S. Fed. Trade Commn’s Statement on the Public Interest, Certain Wire-
less Communication Devices, Portable Music & Data Processing Devices, Computers & Com-
ponents Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-745, Doc. No. 482234 (June 6, 2012).
150 Id. at 1.
151 Id. at 3.
152 Id. at 4.
153 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, POLICY STATEMENT ON
REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY F/RAND COMMIT-
MENTS 7–8 (2013) [hereinafter DOJ & USPTO POLICY STATEMENT], http://www.uspto.gov/
about/offices/ogc/Final_DOJ-PTO_Policy_Statement_on_FRAND_SEPs_1-8-13.pdf.
154 Id. at 6.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 10.
157 Id.
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The Antitrust Division and the USPTO emphasized, nonetheless,
that their policy statement should not be construed as advising that
§ 337’s public-interest factors would counsel against the issuance of an
exclusion order in every case involving SEPs.158 They recognized that an
exclusion order might be appropriate in some circumstances—for exam-
ple, when “the putative licensee is unable or refuses to take a F/RAND
license and is acting outside the scope of the patent holder’s commitment
to license on F/RAND terms.”159 The licensee’s refusal could take the
form of “a constructive refusal to negotiate”160—that is, the licensee’s
insistence on terms that are clearly outside the bounds of “what could
reasonably be considered to be F/RAND terms in an attempt to evade the
putative licensee’s obligation to fairly compensate the patent holder.”161
The Antitrust Division and the USPTO also suggested that an exclusion
order might be warranted “if a putative licensee is not subject to the
jurisdiction of a court that could award damages.”162
In sum, the FTC, the Antitrust Division, and the USPTO have all
proposed that mitigating the risk of patent holdup requires that the ITC
limit the availability of exclusion orders in investigations concerning
SEP-infringing products.
B. The ITC’s Decisions Before President Obama’s Veto
The ITC has considered allegations of the SEP holder’s opportunis-
tic behavior in several investigations that preceded President Obama’s
veto. The ITC typically examined those allegations under § 337(c)—also
called the “all defenses” provision163—which, as explained in Part I.D,
affords the respondent the opportunity to present all legal and equitable
defenses during the ITC’s determination of whether the respondent has
violated § 337.164 However, the ITC has found the respondent’s FRAND
defenses insufficient to preclude the finding of a § 337 violation.
In 2012, for example, in Certain Wireless Communication Devices,
Portable Music and Data Processing Devices, Computers and Compo-
nents Thereof, the ITC considered whether the patent holder’s alleged
failure to comply with the standard-setting organization’s (SSO’s)
rules—specifically, the patent holder’s duty to disclose the patents that
might be essential to practice a standard—rendered the asserted SEPs
158 Id. at 7.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 See, e.g., VastFame Camera, Ltd. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 386 F.3d 1108, 1115–16
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
164 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2012).
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unenforceable.165 Apple, the respondent, claimed that the failure of the
complainant, Motorola, to disclose its SEPs during the standardization
process rendered those SEPs unenforceable under the doctrine of unclean
hands, which allows the court to deny relief if the patent holder’s con-
duct is particularly egregious.166
Judge Thomas Pender found that Apple’s defense did not preclude
the finding of a § 337 violation. He said that, “to succeed in an unclean
hands claim, a plaintiff is required to show that the defendant has en-
gaged in particularly egregious conduct.”167 He emphasized that “it is not
enough merely to show misconduct.”168 However, Judge Pender found
that there was no evidence that Motorola had a duty to disclose its
SEPs.169 He also observed that, even if Apple had provided probative
evidence of Motorola’s obligation to disclose its SEPs, such evidence
would not have sustained Apple’s unclean hands defense, because there
was no evidence that “Motorola’s behavior was a plan to act in bad
faith.”170 He said that, at most, Motorola “made an administrative over-
sight” in not disclosing its patents in a timely manner.171 Judge Pender
emphasized that it would be inappropriate to “refuse to enforce a patent
because a party . . . failed to timely comply with a disclosure require-
ment,” even though that party agreed to offer those SEPs on FRAND
terms.172 Judge Pender concluded that Motorola’s conduct was not so
inequitable as to deprive it of its right to enforce its SEPs and conse-
quently preclude the finding of a § 337 violation.173 Although the ITC
determined that the products did not infringe a valid patent and thus is-
sued no remedy against the respondent’s products, Judge Pender’s rea-
soning showed that alleging that the SEP holder had violated the SSO’s
rules would not necessarily render the asserted SEPs unenforceable.174
165 Certain Wireless Communication Devices, Portable Music & Data Processing De-
vices, Computers & Components Thereof at 142–52, Inv. No. 337-TA-745, Doc. No. 480415
(Apr. 24, 2012) (Initial) [hereinafter USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-745 Initial Determination].
166 Id. at 142.
167 Id. at 22 (quoting Serdarevic v. Advanced Med. Optics, Inc., 532 F.3d 1352, 1361
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
168 Id. (quoting Serdarevic v. Advanced Med. Optics, Inc., 532 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
169 Id. Judge Pender observed that the record contained no ETSI documents relevant to
the requirement to disclose the existence of the patents dated before 2008. Because the rele-
vant patents were filed in 2001 and earlier, and declared to ETSI in 2002, Judge Pender deter-
mined that ETSI’s disclosure policies that Apple had presented to the ITC did not apply to the
relevant patents. Id. at 148–51.
170 Id. at 150.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 151–52.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 142–52.
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The ITC in 2013 again examined a claim about the SEP holder’s
failure to comply with the FRAND obligation in Certain Electronic De-
vices, Including Wireless Communication Devices, Portable Music and
Data Processing Devices, and Tablet Computers.175 Following a com-
plaint filed by Samsung, the ITC investigated whether Apple’s iPhone,
iPad, and iPod Touch devices infringed several of Samsung’s SEPs. Ap-
ple argued, among other things, that, by making a FRAND commitment,
Samsung forfeited any right that it would otherwise have to obtain an
exclusion order or a cease-and-desist order.176
However, the ITC again found Apple’s defense unpersuasive.177
The ITC found that Apple had failed to show that Samsung breached its
obligations arising from a FRAND commitment.178 The ITC emphasized
that a FRAND commitment does not per se preclude the finding of a
§ 337 violation.179 The ITC also said that, before “a party can prove a
breach of an alleged FRAND obligation, it must prove what the obliga-
tion is.”180 However, the ITC found that Apple had failed to provide an
adequate interpretation of the FRAND commitment.181 The ITC added
that the essentiality of the patent to practice the standard appeared to be a
condition precedent to Samsung’s obligations arising from a FRAND
commitment.182 The ITC noted that, although the respondent and the
SEP holder contested the essentiality of the asserted patents, they did not
provide any evidence as to whether the patents were actually essential to
practice the standard.183 The ITC found that, in the absence of such a
determination, it was not clear whether Samsung had any obligations
arising from its FRAND commitment, because it was not clear whether
Samsung’s asserted patents were actually standard-essential.184 In addi-
tion, the ITC observed that, even if one were to assume that the FRAND
commitment imposed an “enforceable obligation,” Samsung’s commit-
ment appeared to be only an “agreement to agree,” which imposed on
Samsung only a duty to negotiate in good faith.185 However, the ITC
reviewed the negotiation history between the parties and found that Ap-
175 USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-794 Final, supra note 148. R
176 Id. at 41.
177 Id. at 44.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 46 (citing Certain Mobile Telephone Handsets, Wireless Communication De-
vices, & Components Thereof at 34, Inv. No. 337-TA-578, Pub. 4132 (USITC Feb. 20, 2007)
(Initial Determination)).
180 Id. at 48.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 50.
183 Id. at 50–51.
184 Id. at 51.
185 Id. at 52 (quoting North Star Steel Co. v. United States, 477 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed.
Cir. 2007)).
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ple provided no evidence that Samsung had failed to negotiate in good
faith.186 The ITC determined that Apple had failed to show that Samsung
violated its FRAND commitment.187 It thus concluded that Apple’s af-
firmative defense based on Samsung’s FRAND commitment did not pre-
clude the finding of a § 337 violation.188
In addition, the ITC examined in that case the risk of patent holdup
in its analysis of the public interest. The ITC acknowledged that some
commentators argued that it was “per se prohibited and contrary to the
public-interest considerations of section 337” to issue an exclusion order
against products that infringe FRAND-committed SEPs.189 However, the
ITC disagreed.190 Although the ITC acknowledged the arguments of Ap-
ple and other public commentators that an exclusion order against Ap-
ple’s infringing products would facilitate patent holdup,191 the ITC noted
that other commentators had claimed the exact opposite—that is, that
denying exclusion orders to SEP holders would give defendants an in-
centive to engage in “reverse holdup.”192 The ITC emphasized that “none
of the parties or commentators submitted any evidence that either result
has actually occurred in the market.”193 The ITC added that, “[a]bsent
empirical evidence of actual harm to consumers or innovation,” concerns
of patent holdup were “policy arguments” that had no place in the public-
interest factors listed in § 337.194 The ITC ultimately issued an exclusion
order and a cease-and-desist order against Apple’s products that in-
fringed the asserted SEPs.195
186 Id. at 59.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 45, 52, 63.
189 Id. at 111. For an example of a comment submitted to the ITC alleging the potential
for patent holdup, see Respondent Apple Inc.’s Written Submission Regarding the Commis-
sion’s Questions on the Issues Under Review, and on Remedy, Bonding, and the Public Inter-
est at 7, Inv. No. 337-TA-794, Doc. No. 498403 (Dec. 3, 2012) (“[I]f FRAND patent holders
could obtain ITC exclusion orders, then every holder of any standard-essential patent—and for
ETSI standards, there are thousands of declared-essential patents, held by dozens of compa-
nies—could threaten standards implementers with the prospect of not being able to import any
standards-compliant products into the United States market.” (emphasis omitted) (internal cita-
tion omitted)).
190 USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-794 Final, supra note 148, at 111. R
191 Id. at 113 n.23.
192 Id. For an example of a comment submitted to the ITC alleging the potential for “re-
verse holdup,” see Motorola Mobility LLC’s Submission In Response to the Commission’s
Request for Submissions on the Public Interest at 13, Inv. No. 337-TA-794, Doc. No. 498346
(Dec. 3, 2012) (“The creation of a categorical rule that a patent holder cannot obtain an injunc-
tion (including an exclusion order) for a FRAND-committed patent would encourage infring-
ers to ‘hold out,’ rather than voluntarily negotiate a license, knowing that they would not be
subject to any ban on the importation of infringing articles.”).
193 USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-794 Final, supra note 148, at 113–14 n.23 (emphasis added). R
194 Id.
195 Id. at 105.
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In sum, in its § 337 investigations, the ITC considered allegations of
the SEP holder’s failure to comply with its FRAND commitment and the
risk of patent holdup. The ITC considers allegations concerning the
FRAND commitment within the “all defenses” provisions—that is, in
determining whether the SEP holder’s FRAND commitment and the SEP
holder’s conduct rendered the asserted SEPs unenforceable. However, in
none of its investigations has the ITC found the respondent’s defenses
sufficiently persuasive to preclude the finding of a § 337 violation. The
ITC has also examined concerns about patent holdup within its public-
interest analysis, but, because of the absence of any empirical evidence,
the ITC refused to conclude that the risk of patent holdup weighed
against the issuance of an exclusion order.
C. President Obama’s Veto
In August 2013, President Obama, acting through U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative Michael Froman, vetoed the exclusion order that the ITC had
issued against Apple on the grounds that the exclusion order would not
serve the public interest.196 In doing so, Ambassador Froman approv-
ingly recited the Antitrust Division’s and the USPTO’s concerns about
patent holdup and patent holdout.197 He emphasized that an exclusion
order should be available to an SEP holder only in exceptional circum-
stances, such as those that the Antitrust Division and USPTO had out-
lined in their policy statement.198
Ambassador Froman found that, in this specific investigation, an
exclusion order against Apple would adversely affect the U.S. econ-
omy’s competitive conditions and consumers.199 Unfortunately, Ambas-
sador Froman’s letter provided little explanation for his disapproval.
Ambassador Froman did not examine whether Samsung made a FRAND
offer, whether Apple failed to accept a FRAND offer, or whether Apple
was acting outside the scope of the FRAND commitment and was thus
engaging in a constructive refusal to negotiate.200 Ambassador Froman
provided no explanation as to how the ITC had erred in examining evi-
dence of patent holdup. He simply said that, “although the parties dispute
the facts vigorously, it is beyond the scope of this policy review to revisit
the Commission’s legal analysis or its finding based on its record.”201
Ambassador Froman instructed that, in future investigations involv-
ing FRAND-committed SEPs, the ITC should (1) “examine thoroughly
196 Ambassador Froman’s Letter, supra note 6. R
197 Id. at 2.
198 For a detailed analysis of the suggestions presented in the policy statement,
see Part II.A.
199 Ambassador Froman’s Letter, supra note 6, at 1–3. R
200 Id.
201 Id. at 3.
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and carefully on its own initiative the public-interest issues presented
both at the outset of its proceeding and when determining whether a par-
ticular remedy is in the public interest,” and (2) “seek proactively to have
the parties develop a comprehensive factual record . . . including infor-
mation on the standard-essential nature of the patent at issue and . . . the
presence or absence of patent hold-up or reverse hold-up.”202 He said
that he would analyze those elements when reviewing future ITC deci-
sions. However, the ITC did examine allegations of the SEP holder’s
failure to comply with the FRAND commitment and of patent holdup in
past investigations.203  Ambassador Froman did not say how the ITC
should change its analysis in light of his instructions.
D. The Availability of an Exclusion Order After President Obama’s
Veto
After President Obama’s veto, the presiding ALJ in several investi-
gations examined whether to issue an exclusion order against products
that infringed FRAND-committed SEPs. However, in none of those in-
vestigations did the ALJ find the presented evidence sufficiently persua-
sive to advise against the ITC’s issuance of an exclusion order.
1. Certain Wireless Devices with 3G and/or 4G Capabilities
and Components Thereof
In June 2014, in Certain Wireless Devices with 3G and/or 4G Capa-
bilities and Components Thereof, Administrative Law Judge Theodore
Essex examined whether the ITC should issue an exclusion order against
smartphones that allegedly infringed InterDigital’s patents essential to
the mobile communication standards.204 Judge Essex found that the re-
spondents’ products did not infringe the asserted patents and, conse-
quently, he determined that there was no violation of § 337.205
Nonetheless, he analyzed whether InterDigital had violated the obliga-
tions of the FRAND commitment that it made to the European Telecom-
munications Standards Institute (ETSI), and whether there was evidence
of patent holdup, if (contrary to Judge Essex’s conclusion) the ITC were
to find the alleged patents infringed. Judge Essex’s discussion of
FRAND-related issues preceded his analysis of the public interest, which
suggests that he considered the respondents’ FRAND-related arguments
to be a defense against the complainant’s allegations of a § 337 violation.
202 Id.
203 See supra Part IV.B.
204 Certain Wireless Devices with 3G and/or 4G Capabilities & Components Thereof,
Inv. No. 337-TA-868, Pub. 2929, 2014 WL 2965327 (USITC June 13, 2014) (Initial).
205 Id. at *109.
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Judge Essex first asked whether the asserted patents were subject to
a FRAND commitment. He found that, because the respondents did not
infringe the asserted patents, the patents were necessarily inessential to
practicing the standard and thus were outside the FRAND commit-
ment.206 Assuming (contrary to this finding) that the patents were essen-
tial, Judge Essex next analyzed InterDigital’s FRAND obligations.
Judge Essex observed that InterDigital’s obligations toward poten-
tial standard implementers derived from its licensing declaration to ETSI
and other ETSI rules. He found that ETSI’s Rules of Procedure were not
a contract, but merely rules to “guide [ETSI and its members] in their
interactions with the organization, other members and third parties.”207
He also found that ETSI’s rules imposed obligations both on the SEP
holder and on the implementers of ETSI’s standards,208 and he found that
the respondents had not performed any of the duties that ETSI’s rules
imposed on them as implementers.209 For example, Judge Essex noted
that ETSI’s procedural rules provide mechanisms for resolving disputes
in which the SEP holder “refus[es] to grant a license on FRAND
terms.”210 However, he found that none of the respondents had availed
themselves of such dispute-resolution mechanisms.211 Judge Essex also
found that although ETSI’s rules required implementers to contact the
SEP holder and obtain a license, the respondents had failed to do so.212
He further found that, although ETSI’s rule imposed a duty to negotiate
in good faith, it did not bar participants from using legal remedies when
their rights had been violated.213 Because he found no evidence that In-
terDigital had violated its contractual obligations or had negotiated the
license in bad faith, Judge Essex rejected the respondents’ allegation that
InterDigital had failed to comply with its FRAND commitment.214
Judge Essex also analyzed evidence of patent holdup and patent
holdout. He acknowledged the concern over patent holdup that the FTC,
the DOJ, and the USPTO had expressed in their various policy state-
ments, but he found that, in the specific case at hand, there was no evi-
dence that InterDigital had attempted to hold up the respondents.215
Judge Essex said that, “[w]hile there may be a hypothetical risk of
holdup, we have evidence that it is not a threat in this case, or in this
206 Id. at *74.
207 Id. at *75.
208 Id. at *79.
209 Id. at *80.
210 Id. at *77.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at *80–81.
214 Id.
215 Id. at *81.
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industry.”216 He opposed denying an exclusion order merely on the basis
of “a speculative and unproven position . . . without proof that the
harm . . . exists.”217 The ITC, however, mooted Judge Essex’s analysis of
patent holdup when, in reviewing his initial determination, it affirmed
Judge Essex’s finding that none of the respondents infringed InterDig-
ital’s patents, such that no exclusion order was available.218
2. Certain 3G Mobile Handsets and Components Thereof
In April 2015, in Certain 3G Mobile Handsets and Components
Thereof, Judge Essex again examined the availability of an exclusion
order against products that infringed FRAND-committed SEPs.219 In-
terDigital, the SEP holder, sought an exclusion order against Nokia’s and
Microsoft Mobile’s products that allegedly infringed InterDigital’s SEPs.
In remanding the initial determination, the Commission specifically re-
quired Judge Essex to examine evidence of patent holdup and patent
holdout.220 In his initial determination on remand, Judge Essex examined
FRAND-related arguments similar to the ones that he analyzed in Cer-
tain Wireless Devices with 3G and/or 4G Capabilities. On this occasion,
however, he included a discussion of FRAND obligations in the public-
interest analysis.
Judge Essex rejected the allegations that InterDigital had breached
its FRAND obligations.221 Although he again found the asserted patents
to be inessential to practicing the standard (and thus outside InterDig-
ital’s FRAND commitment),222 he analyzed whether there was evidence
that InterDigital had violated its FRAND obligations in the hypothetical
(counterfactual) scenario in which InterDigital’s patents were essen-
tial.223 Judge Essex found no evidence that InterDigital had acted in bad
faith or “refus[ed] to work towards a FRAND license.”224 He observed
that no court had ever determined whether InterDigital’s offers were
FRAND.225 He added that, even under the assumption that InterDigital’s
offers were not FRAND, courts have said that the SEP holder’s initial
offer does need not to be FRAND, “so long as a [F]RAND license even-
216 Id.
217 Id. at *83.
218 Certain Wireless Devices with 3G and/or 4G Capabilities & Components Thereof at
14, Inv. No. 337-TA-868, Doc. No. 541147 (USITC Aug. 28, 2014) (Final).
219 Certain 3G Mobile Handsets and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-613, 2015
WL 6561709 (USITC Apr. 27, 2015) (Initial Determination on Remand).
220 See, e.g., Certain 3G Mobile Handsets and Components Thereof at 5, Inv. No. 337-
TA-613 (USITC Mar. 24, 2014) (Commission Determination to Remand Investigation).
221 Certain 3G Mobile Handsets and Components Thereof, 2015 WL 6561709, at *16–20.
222 Id. at *17–18.
223 Id. at *18–20.
224 Id. at *23.
225 Id. at *19.
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tually issues.”226 Judge Essex said that InterDigital’s act of making an
offer showed that it was trying to reach a licensing agreement with the
respondents.227 He thus concluded that the factual record did not support
the conclusion that InterDigital violated its FRAND obligations.
Judge Essex also examined whether there was any evidence of pat-
ent holdup or patent holdout. He emphasized that, in Ericsson v. D-Link,
the Federal Circuit said that the infringer bears the burden of providing
evidence of patent holdup.228 Judge Essex found that respondents had
“fail[ed] to carry that burden,”229 because they “simply restate[d] the
possibility of a hold-up, without providing or citing to any evidence.”230
In addition, he found that the respondents had engaged in patent
holdout.231 Because the specific facts of the case suggested that opportu-
nism by the respondents was more likely than opportunism by the SEP
holder, Judge Essex concluded that the presented evidence did not advise
against the ITC’s issuance of an exclusion order.232 However, the ITC
ulimately concluded that Nokia and Microsoft Mobile did not infringe
the asserted claims of InterDigital’s SEPs; thus, the Commission mooted
consideration of the relevance of the FRAND obligation to the issuance
of an exclusion order.233
3. Certain Wireless Standard Compliant Electronic Devices,
Including Communication Devices and Tablet Computers
In November 2015, Judge Dee Lord addressed a similar question in
Certain Wireless Standard Compliant Electronic Devices, Including
Communication Devices and Tablet Computers.234 Ericsson, the com-
plainant, moved to compel discovery of documents relevant to determin-
ing whether Ericsson had made a FRAND offer to the respondent.235
Ericsson argued that such evidence would become essential in the public-
interest analysis when the ALJ would be asked to determine whether
Ericsson had attempted to hold up the respondent.236 However,
226 Id. at *20.
227 Id.
228 Id. at *20–21 (citing Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1234 (Fed.
Cir. 2014)).
229 Id. at *21.
230 Id. at *14.
231 Id. at *26.
232 Id. at *23.
233 Certain 3G Mobile Handsets & Components Thereof at 44, 46, 50, Inv. No. 337-TA-
613, Pub. 4145 (USITC Sept. 21, 2015) (Final) [hereinafter USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-613
Final].
234 Certain Wireless Standard Compliant Electronic Devices, Including Communication
Devices & Table Computers, Inv. No. 337-TA-953, 2015 WL 9875533 (USITC Nov. 10,
2015) (Order Granting-in-Part and Denying-in-Part Complainant’s Motion to Compel).
235 Id. at *1.
236 Id. at *2.
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Judge Lord denied Ericsson’s motion on the ground that the ITC “has
never held that disputes over FRAND pricing must be considered either
in deciding whether there is a violation [of § 337] or in the public inter-
est/remedy phase of section 337 proceedings.”237 Judge Lord added that,
“[t]o the extent the ITC’s views differ from those of the U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative, [an ALJ’s] duty is to follow the policy of the ITC.”238 She
said that it would be inappropriate to compel such a “massive discovery”
with the purpose of determining a contractual dispute arising from Erics-
son’s FRAND obligations.239
Judge Lord emphasized that no party had presented a “legal argu-
ment or authority to establish that the existence of a FRAND offer is
pertinent to the determination of whether there is a violation of sec-
tion 337.”240 She said that Ericsson’s compliance with the FRAND com-
mitment was a question of contract law that required resolution in district
court.241 Judge Lord emphasized that the ITC has no “authority” to adju-
dicate contract disputes.242 She accepted the argument that the purpose of
a FRAND commitment might be to avoid patent holdup.243 However,
Judge Lord emphasized that, regardless of the purpose of a FRAND
commitment, an ALJ does not have the jurisdiction to enforce an SSO’s
rules.244 She emphasized that an ALJ can examine those rules “only to
the extent that they relate to [a] viable affirmative defense[ ].”245
Judge Lord thus concluded that Ericsson’s compliance with its FRAND
commitment was irrelevant to determining whether a violation of
§ 337 had occurred.
Judge Lord also said that examining Ericsson’s compliance with the
FRAND commitment would exceed the ITC’s statutory authority to ana-
lyze the public interest.246 She said that the statutorily enumerated pub-
lic-interest factors that an ALJ must consider before issuing an exclusion
order do not include as a factor the complainant’s compliance with its
FRAND obligations.247 Judge Lord said that the ITC “can take into con-
sideration matters that, ultimately, it does not act upon.”248 She added
that the ITC “may wish to consider whether it should withhold or modify
237 Id. (emphasis in original) (citing USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-794 Final, supra note 148, R
at 45–52).
238 Id. at *2 n.1.
239 Id. at *2.
240 Id. at *3.
241 Id. at *2.
242 Id. at *2–3.
243 Id. at *3.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id. at *3–4.
247 Id. at *4.
248 Id.
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the statutory remedies in cases involving [SEPs].”249 Judge Lord also
said that the ITC might consider “judicial rulings on counterclaims as
part of the . . . consideration of the effect of a remedial order on the
public interest.”250 This statement suggests that a respondent could pre-
sent to the ITC a court ruling finding that the SEP holder breached its
FRAND obligation, and that the ITC could consider a district court’s
decision when determining whether to issue an exclusion order.
Judge Lord nonetheless concluded that she would not permit burdensome
discovery that would seek only to resolve a private contractual
dispute.251
4. Summation
After President Obama’s veto in 2013 in the Apple-Samsung dis-
pute, some ALJs at the ITC have included in their initial determinations
an examination of (1) the patent’s essentiality, (2) the SEP holder’s com-
pliance with its FRAND commitment, and (3) evidence of patent holdup
or patent holdout. However, at least one ALJ has declined to compel
discovery of documents necessary to analyze the complainant’s compli-
ance with its FRAND commitment. Although it remains to be seen
whether the ITC will ever again issue an exclusion order against an arti-
cle infringing SEPs, the reasoning of several ALJs suggests that unsup-
ported allegations of patent holdup, or of the SEP holder’s failure to
comply with its FRAND commitment, are insufficient to advise the
Commission against issuing an exclusion order.
V. FRAND-COMMITTED SEPS AND THE PUBLIC-INTEREST ANALYSIS
Ambassador Froman instructed the ITC to examine “thoroughly and
carefully the public-interest issues” when determining whether to issue
an exclusion order in an investigation concerning FRAND-committed
SEPs.252 He said that the ITC should develop a “factual record” related
to the public-interest analysis, including information about the patent’s
essentiality and about the presence or absence of patent holdup and pat-
ent holdout.253 However, Ambassador Froman did not explain what evi-
dence the ITC should examine to determine whether patent holdup has
occurred in a particular case or whether a patent is actually essential to
practice a standard. In this part, I examine the economic evidence that
should inform the ITC’s decision, and the burden of proof that each party
bears in presenting that evidence.
249 Id.
250 Id. (quoting 59 Fed. Reg. 67,622 (Dec. 30, 1994)).
251 Id.
252 Ambassador Froman’s Letter, supra note 6, at 3. R
253 Id.
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A. Evidence of Patent Holdup
When evaluating allegations of patent holdup, the ITC should deter-
mine whether the SEP holder has extended to the respondent a FRAND
offer. Because patent holdup is defined as the SEP holder’s attempt to
obtain compensation above the FRAND range, finding that the SEP
holder has extended a FRAND offer supports the conclusion that no pat-
ent holdup has occurred in that particular case. Only when the parties
have not exchanged any licensing offers should the ITC examine the SEP
holder’s conduct in negotiating the license terms with the respondent to
determine whether the SEP holder has attempted to hold up the
respondent.
1. Has the SEP Holder Made a FRAND Offer?
Patent holdup, as defined by the FTC, the Antitrust Division, and
the USPTO, is an SEP holder’s attempt to extract a royalty for its SEPs
that exceeds the FRAND range.254 When the SEP holder has offered the
respondent a FRAND license, by definition, there is no patent holdup.
Indeed, the question of whether the SEP holder’s offer is within the
FRAND range is a factual inquiry that requires analysis of economic
evidence to establish the bounds of that range.255 The ITC cannot accept
unsupported assertions that the SEP holder’s offer is within or outside
the FRAND range. Instead, it should require the parties to provide eco-
nomic evidence to support their respective assertions.
The ITC might use various economic methodologies to determine
the FRAND range and whether the SEP holder’s offer is within that
range.256 If available, comparable license agreements—license agree-
ments made in sufficiently comparable circumstances—are typically the
most reliable economic evidence to establish a FRAND range.257 Evi-
dence that the SEP holder’s offer is consistent with the terms of the com-
254 See, e.g., Third Party U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s Statement on the Public Inter-
est at 1, Inv. No. 337-TA-745, Doc. No. 482234 (USITC June 6, 2012) (explaining that an
SEP holder could seek an exclusion order “as a way of securing royalties . . . inconsistent with
that RAND commitment”); DOJ & USPTO POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 153, at 6 (explain- R
ing that an exclusion order could allow the SEP holder to pressure a potential licensee to
accept “more onerous licensing terms than the patent holder would be entitled to receive con-
sistent with the F/RAND commitment”).
255 For an analysis of the factors that influence the bargaining range over which a patent
holder and a licensee negotiate to determine a reasonable royalty for the use of a patented
technology, see J. Gregory Sidak, Bargaining Power and Patent Damages, 19 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 1 (2015).
256 For a survey of various economic methodologies to calculate a FRAND royalty, see J.
Gregory Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 931,
1000 (2013).
257 See J. Gregory Sidak, Apportionment, FRAND Royalties, and Comparable Licenses
After Ericsson v. D-Link, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1809, 1821–22.
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parable license agreements supports the conclusion that the offer is
FRAND. If the SEP holder has made an offer to the respondent that is
within the FRAND range, the ITC should reject any allegation of patent
holdup. The respondent’s reason for rejecting the SEP holder’s FRAND
offer is not relevant to the ITC’s analysis of patent holdup.
Conversely, evidence that the SEP holder’s offer departs signifi-
cantly from the licensing terms specified in comparable license agree-
ments supports the conclusion that the SEP holder’s offer is outside the
FRAND range. Finding that the SEP holder’s offer exceeds the FRAND
range would support the conclusion that the SEP holder has attempted to
hold up the respondent. Some U.S. courts have said that a FRAND com-
mitment does not require that the SEP holder’s opening offer be within
the FRAND range. For example, in Microsoft v. Motorola, Judge James
Robart said that, “under Motorola’s agreements with the IEEE and the
ITU, Motorola need not make initial offers on [F]RAND terms” as long
as the ultimate license agreement is within the FRAND range.258 How-
ever, such an approach is misguided because it ignores that, in the con-
text of SEPs, time is of the essence.259 To ensure the expeditious
implementation of the standard, the SEP holder’s first offer should be
within the FRAND range. However, even assuming that an SEP holder
might have the right to make an initial offer outside the FRAND range,
the SEP holder should typically be restrained from seeking an injunction
or an exclusion order before making an offer within the FRAND range.
Therefore, evidence that the SEP holder’s offer exceeds the FRAND
range should support the conclusion that the SEP holder has attempted to
hold up the respondent, and such evidence should weigh against the
ITC’s issuance of an exclusion order.
2. Has the SEP Holder Taken the Necessary Steps to Make a
FRAND Offer?
A respondent might allege that the SEP holder is also attempting to
engage in patent holdup if the SEP holder and the respondent have not
exchanged any licensing offers. However, the SEP holder’s failure to
make an offer is not necessarily evidence of patent holdup. As the Anti-
trust Division and the USPTO have emphasized, there is no patent
holdup when the potential licensee has constructively refused to negoti-
ate.260 It is possible, for example, that the respondent refuses to commu-
nicate with the SEP holder or that the respondent refuses to sign a
nondisclosure agreement with the SEP holder that would enable the ex-
258 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1038 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
259 J. Gregory Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part II: Injunctions, 11 J. COMPETITION L.
& ECON. 201, 243 (2015) (internal citations omitted).
260 DOJ & USPTO POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 153, at 7. R
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change of information necessary to make an offer.261 Such conduct pre-
cludes any negotiation between the SEP holder and the respondent
concerning the specific terms of a license agreement. In such circum-
stances, it would be incorrect to conclude that the SEP holder has at-
tempted to hold up the respondent.
If the SEP holder has not extended any offer to the respondent, the
ITC should examine the SEP holder’s conduct during the licensing nego-
tiations to determine whether patent holdup has occurred in that particu-
lar case. Specifically, the ITC should determine whether (1) the SEP
holder has notified the respondent about the respondent’s alleged in-
fringement and (2) the SEP holder has taken the necessary steps to initi-
ate negotiations. The ITC might consider evidence concerning industry
norms and licensing practices in determining whether the SEP holder has
made the necessary steps to initiate a negotiation with the respondent.
Evidence that the SEP holder has taken such steps would support the
conclusion that the SEP holder has not attempted to hold up the
respondent.
B. The Burden of Proof
Ambassador Froman’s instructions concerning evidence of patent
holdup and patent holdout has sparked debate among academics and
practitioners regarding which party should bear the burden of proving
whether patent holdup or patent holdout has occurred in a particular
case.262 For example, in 2015, Chairwoman Edith Ramirez of the Federal
Trade Commission submitted a written statement in Certain 3G Mobile
Handsets in which she proposed that the ITC should “require a[n] SEP
holder to prove that the implementer is unwilling or unable to take a
FRAND license.”263 She suggested that the SEP holder “may demon-
strate an implementer’s unwillingness in a number of ways”264—for ex-
ample, by showing that the potential licensee is unwilling to negotiate or
261 See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, FRAND in India, in 1 CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNI-
CAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: ANTITRUST AND PATENTS (Jorge Contreras ed., forthcoming
2017) (manuscript at 7), https://www.criterioneconomics.com/frand-in-india-royalties-for-
standard-essential-patents.html (“[T]he court observed that, because iBall refused to sign a[ ]
[nondisclosure agreement], a negotiation between the parties could not commence.” (citing
Order ¶¶ 1–2, at 1–2, Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. M/S Best IT World Private Ltd.
(iBall), Interim Application 17351 of 2015 in Civil Suit (Original Side) in No. 2501 of 2015,
High Ct. of Delhi (Sept. 2, 2015), http://lobis.nic.in/ddir/dhc/MAN/judgement/03-09-2015/
MAN02092015S25012015.pdf)).
262 See, e.g., Written Submission on the Public Interest of Federal Trade Commission
Chairwoman Edith Ramirez, Certain 3G Mobile Handsets and Components Thereof, Inv. No.
337-TA-613, 2015 WL 4396145, at *1 (July 10, 2015); Reply Submission on the Public Inter-
est of Federal Trade Commissioners Maureen K. Ohlhausen and Joshua D. Wright, Inv. No.
337-TA-613 (July 20, 2015).
263 Ramirez ITC Submission, 2015 WL 4396145, at *1.
264 Id. at *3.
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that the respondent is insisting on terms that are clearly outside a reason-
able interpretation of FRAND.265 Chairwoman Ramirez’s proposal im-
plicitly suggests that the ITC’s public-interest analysis should presume
that the issuance of an exclusion order against products that infringe an
SEP disserves the public interest. Her proposal would then allow the SEP
holder to rebut that presumption of harm, by showing that the licensee
was unwilling to accept a FRAND offer. Put differently, Chairwoman
Ramirez’s proposal presumes that, absent evidence of the licensee’s un-
willingness, the SEP holder’s request for an exclusion order serves only
to enable patent holdup.
However, Chairwoman Ramirez’s suggestions contradict basic legal
and economic principles that guide § 337 investigations. The Tariff Act
provides that, upon finding a violation of § 337, the Commission shall
issue an exclusion order unless the public interest dictates otherwise.266
When deciding whether to issue an exclusion order, the ITC begins its
public-interest analysis with the presumption that an exclusion order will
serve the public interest.267 It is for the respondents to rebut that pre-
sumption, by showing that the public-interest factors advise against issu-
ing an exclusion order. Congress’s use of the word “unless” in the
statutory language of § 337’s public-interest provision indicates that,
upon finding a violation, the ITC’s rejection of an exclusion order is an
exception to the general rule of issuing the exclusion order. A respondent
that seeks to avoid an exclusion order must therefore bear the burden of
proving that, in its particular case, the public-interest factors counsel
against the issuance of an exclusion order.
There is no valid legal or economic justification to depart from the
ITC’s established approach for delegating the public-interest burden in
investigations concerning FRAND-committed SEPs. As sec-
tion 210.27(a) of the ITC’s rules states, “[t]he proponent of any factual
proposition shall be required to sustain the burden of proof with respect
265 Id.
266 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2012).
267 See, e.g., Certain Mobile Devices, Associated Software, & Components Thereof, Inv.
No. 337-TA-744, Pub. 4384, 2012 WL 3715788, at *18 (USITC June 5, 2012) (Final) (“[W]e
note that the public interest favors the protection of U.S. intellectual property rights.”); Certain
Baseband Processor Chips & Chipsets, Transmitter & Receiver (Radio) Chips, Power Control
Chips, & Prods. Containing Same, Including Cellular Telephone Handsets, Inv. No. 337-TA-
543, Pub. 4258, 2011 WL 6121182, at *75 (USITC Oct. 1, 2011) (Final) (“[I]n assessing
public interest factors when granting relief, the Commission relies on the strong public interest
in enforcing intellectual property rights.”); Certain Ground Fault Circuit Interrupters & Prods.
Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-739, 2012 WL 2394435, at *60 (USITC June 8, 2012)
(Final) (“[C]ompetitive conditions in the U.S. economy are advanced by the consistent en-
forcement of valid U.S. patent rights.”); Certain Two-Handle Centerset Faucets & Escutch-
eons, & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-422, Pub. 3332, 2000 WL 1159298, at *9
(USITC June 19, 2000) (Final) (“[T]he public interest favors the protection of U.S. intellectual
property rights by excluding infringing imports”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\26-1\CJP104.txt unknown Seq: 38 13-DEC-16 13:24
162 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 26:125
thereto.”268 It is hence for a respondent alleging that the SEP holder has
engaged in patent holdup to provide sufficient evidence to support that
claim. There is no valid justification for assuming that the SEP holder’s
offer was not FRAND simply because the respondent claims so. The
respondent should be able to substantiate its claims and present to the
ITC the factual basis for its conclusion that the SEP holder’s offer was
not FRAND.
Both the Federal Circuit and Ambassador Froman have endorsed
the analysis of factual, empirical evidence to substantiate allegations of
patent holdup and patent holdout. Economists are sharply divided on the
question of whether patent holdup is more than a merely theoretical con-
cern.269 The Federal Circuit has taken no position on the economic theo-
ries of patent holdup or holdout, but instead, it has required the party
alleging either type of opportunism to support that allegation with empir-
ical evidence.270 The Federal Circuit emphasized that “something more
than a general argument that these phenomena are possibilities is neces-
sary.”271 Ambassador Froman, in his letter to the ITC in 2013, also rec-
ommended that the ITC collect empirical evidence to bolster any
findings on patent holdup.272 Therefore, presuming (rather than demand-
ing evidence) that an exclusion order disserves the public interest in
cases concerning FRAND-committed SEPs (because of a theoretical risk
of patent holdup) would contradict not only the ITC’s rules, but also the
Federal Circuit’s principles and Ambassador Froman’s instructions to the
ITC.
Chairwoman Ramirez’s proposal to reverse the burden of proof
would also disfavor SEP holders that have fully complied with their
FRAND obligations. To illustrate, suppose that the FRAND range for an
SEP portfolio is between $3 and $15 per infringing device and, suppose
further that the SEP holder has made an offer within the FRAND
268 19 C.F.R. § 210.27(a) (2015).
269 Compare Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 5, and Farrell, Hayes, Shapiro & Sullivan, R
supra note 5, with J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunc- R
tive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro, 92 MINN. L. REV. 714
(2008), and Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber & Ross Levine, An Empirical Examination
of Patent Holdup, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 549, 572 (2015), and Joshua D. Wright,
Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Center for the Protection of Intellectual Prop-
erty Inaugural Academic Conference: The Commercial Function of Patents in Today’s Innova-
tion Economy 20 (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_
statements/ssos-frand-and-antitrust-lessons-economicsincomplete-contracts/130912cpip.pdf
(“Despite the amount of attention patent hold-up has drawn from policymakers and academics,
there have been relatively few instances of litigated patent hold-up among the thousands of
standards adopted.”).
270 Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 809 F.3d 1295, 1302
(Fed. Cir. 2015); Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
271 Ericsson v. D-Link, 773 F.3d at 1232.
272 See Ambassador Froman’s Letter, supra note 6, at 3. R
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range—say, $14 per infringing device. The exact duties that arise from a
contract between an SEP holder and an SSO are determined by the spe-
cific FRAND commitment, and by the intellectual property rights (IPR)
policies of the SSO, which might differ depending on the SSO. For most
SSOs, however, a voluntary FRAND commitment means that the SEP
holder undertakes a duty to offer to license its SEPs on FRAND terms to
anyone seeking to implement the standard. Thus, by making an offer of
$14 per infringing device, the SEP holder has discharged its FRAND
obligation as a matter of contract law. Suppose further that the respon-
dent has refused the $14 FRAND offer in an attempt to persuade the SEP
holder to accept an offer at the lower boundary of the FRAND range—
for example, $3.01 per infringing device. After a lengthy negotiation,
suppose that the parties fail to reach an agreement, and the SEP holder
files a complaint at the ITC, requesting that the ITC issue an exclusion
order against the respondent’s infringing product. If the ITC were to
adopt Chairwoman Ramirez’s approach, the SEP holder could not obtain
an exclusion order, because it could neither (1) show that the respondent
was unwilling to negotiate a license nor (2) show that the respondent had
made an offer “clearly outside a reasonable interpretation of FRAND”
(assuming, in this example, that $3.01 per infringing device is within the
FRAND range).273 On the basis of Chairwoman Ramirez’s suggested ap-
proach, an SEP holder that had made a FRAND offer and had fully dis-
charged its FRAND obligation would not be able to show that the
issuance of an exclusion order does not conflict with the public interest,
and thus would receive no remedy for the respondent’s infringement.
In sum, it should be for the respondent to prove that, in a given
investigation, the issuance of an exclusion order would disserve the pub-
lic interest because the SEP holder has engaged, or has attempted to en-
gage, in patent holdup. If the respondent shows that the SEP holder has
attempted to engage in patent holdup, the ITC would conclude that the
public-interest factors weigh against the benefit of an exclusion order.
Conversely, if the respondents fail to present such evidence, then the ITC
has a statutory duty to issue an exclusion order upon finding a violation
of § 337 (assuming that the other statutorily enumerated public-interest
factors indicate that an exclusion order would not disserve the public
interest).
C. A Patent’s Essentiality and the FRAND Commitment
Ambassador Froman instructed the ITC also to require the parties to
develop a factual record regarding “the standard-essential nature of the
273 Written Submission on the Public Interest of Federal Trade Commission Chairwoman
Edith Ramirez, Certain 3G Mobile Handsets and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-613,
2015 WL 4396145, at *3 (July 10, 2015).
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patent at issue if contested by the patent holder.”274 Although his state-
ment superficially seems to imply that the ITC should examine the as-
serted patent’s essentiality, closer analysis shows that, in practice,
Ambassador Froman asked the ITC to assume that the asserted patent is
essential and, therefore, subject to a FRAND commitment.
1. Is the Patent’s Essentiality a Condition Precedent to the
FRAND Obligations?
A patent’s essentiality to practice a standard is not obvious. During
the standardization process, the SSO typically asks its participants to dis-
close any patent that they believe is essential, or might become essential,
to practice that standard.275 The SSO also requires that each participant
clarify whether it would be willing to license its patent on FRAND terms
if implemented in the standard.276 The SSO’s rules generally do not obli-
gate the patent holder to perform a patent search when disclosing its es-
sential patents, but they require the patent holder to make such a
declaration on the basis of good faith and belief.277 At no point in the
development and promulgation of a technical standard is there any pro-
cess of checking which patents are actually essential to practice the stan-
dard. Consequently, it should be no surprise that some patents that have
been declared as potentially essential are, in fact, inessential.
A patent’s essentiality to a standard has limited relevance to deter-
mining whether a particular product infringes a patent. The Tariff Act
does not differentiate between the infringement of patents that are essen-
tial to an industry standard and those that are not.278 The finding that a
patent is inessential does not necessarily imply that the patent is not in-
fringed. A product might infringe a patent, even if that patent was previ-
ously declared essential to an industry standard but ultimately found to
be inessential.
The patent’s essentiality is fundamental, nevertheless, to determin-
ing whether the patent holder has a duty to license that patent on FRAND
terms. The SEP holder’s duty to offer to license its SEPs on FRAND
terms is typically conditional upon the essentiality of its patent to prac-
tice a particular standard.279 An SEP holder that submits a FRAND dec-
274 Ambassador Froman’s Letter, supra note 6, at 3. R
275 See, e.g., European Telecommunication Standards Institute [ETSI], ETSI Intellectual
Property Rights Policy, Annex 6, § 4.1 (Nov. 18, 2015) [hereinafter ETSI IPR Policy], http://
www.etsi.org/images/files/IPR/etsi-ipr-policy.pdf.
276 Id. § 6.
277 Id. § 4.1.
278 See, e.g., USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-794 Final, supra note 148, at 46–47. R
279 See J. Gregory Sidak, A FRAND Contract’s Intended Third-Party Beneficiary, 1 CRI-
TERION J. ON INNOVATION (forthcoming 2016), https://www.criterioneconomics.com/a-frand-
contracts-intended-third-party-beneficiary.html.
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laration to ETSI, for example, agrees that, “[t]o the extent that the IPR(s)
[intellectual property rights] disclosed in the attached IPR Information
Statement Annex are or become, and remain ESSENTIAL,” the SEP
holder will offer an irrevocable license on FRAND terms.280 By declar-
ing a patent to be essential, an SEP holder thus agrees to offer to license
its SEPs on FRAND terms, subject to the condition that its patents “are
or become, and remain” essential to practice ETSI’s standard.281 In legal
terms, a patent’s essentiality is a condition precedent to the SEP holder’s
duty to ETSI to license the patent on FRAND terms to implementers of
ETSI’s standard. If a patent is not (or is no longer) essential to practice
ETSI’s standard, then the patent holder does not have a duty to offer to
license that patent on FRAND terms.282 From a contract law perspective,
any analysis of the patent holder’s compliance with the FRAND commit-
ment becomes immaterial after the ITC has found a patent inessential.
Curiously, Ambassador Froman said that the ITC should examine
the patent’s essentiality only if contested by the patent holder. However,
the complainant typically does not contest the essentiality of its own pat-
ents. It is instead the respondent that typically presents such an allega-
tion, by using a claim about inessentiality as evidence that the
respondent’s product does not infringe the patent. Nonetheless, as
Judge Essex has observed, by claiming that a patent is inessential, the
respondent risks losing any benefit that it might gain from the patent
holder’s FRAND commitment.283 Ambassador Froman’s statement
seems to imply that the ITC should not consider a respondent’s claim of
noninfringement as an implicit challenge to the patent’s essentiality. In-
stead, Ambassador Froman’s statement suggests that the ITC should as-
sume that the patents are essential to practice the standard and,
consequently, are subject to a FRAND commitment, unless the patent
holder explicitly contests its patents’ essentiality.
2. Is the FRAND Commitment an Enforceable Contract?
In examining a patent’s essentiality, the ITC has raised a question
that Ambassador Froman ignored in his letter: does a FRAND commit-
ment constitute an enforceable contract?
280 ETSI, Ericsson’s IPR Information Statement and Licensing Declaration, ISLD-
201509-007, at 1 (Oct. 1, 2015) [hereinafter Ericsson’s Licensing Declaration to ETSI] (em-
phasis in original), https://ipr.etsi.org/IPRDetails.aspx?IPRD_ID=2211&IPRD_TYPE_ID
=2&MODE=2.
281 Id.
282 Certain 3G Mobile Handsets and Components Thereof at 36–38, Inv. No. 337-TA-
613, Pub. 4145 (USITC May 8, 2015) (Initial) [hereinafter USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-613
Initial].
283 Id. at 37 (“Respondents in this case have vigorously asserted that the patents in issue
are not essential. . . . By so claiming, they risk losing the benefit of any defense they may have
under the ETSI agreement regarding FRAND rights that protect the interests of third parties.”).
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Indeed, whether a commitment reaches the level of a binding con-
tract is a fact-specific question that needs to be determined on the basis
of the particular terms of that commitment and the contract law that ap-
plies to the specific case. In most U.S. jurisdictions, the essential ele-
ments of a contract are (1) an offer, (2) an acceptance of the offer, (3) an
understanding between the parties regarding the essential terms of the
contract, and (4) consideration, which is some legal benefit given or legal
detriment suffered by each party in exchange for the other party’s prom-
ise or performance.284 Nonetheless, a contract’s essential elements might
differ in jurisdictions outside the United States. An SEP holder’s
FRAND commitment is not an enforceable contract if it does not contain
the necessary elements to form a binding contract under the applicable
law.
Some U.S. courts have found an SEP holder’s FRAND commitment
to be a binding contract between the SEP holder and the SSO.285 For
example, in Apple v. Motorola, Judge Barbara Crabb of the District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin considered whether Motor-
ola had entered into a binding FRAND contract with ETSI and the IEEE,
respectively.286 She found:
Both Motorola and the organizations benefited from this
arrangement and thus, the element of consideration is
satisfied. Motorola received the benefit of participating
in the standards development process and influencing
the choice of technology for the standards. The organiza-
tions benefited from Motorola’s commitments by know-
ing that their technical standards would be available for
use by third parties.287
Judge Crabb thus found each of Motorola’s FRAND commitments to be
a bargain between the SSO and Motorola in which Motorola agreed to
make its technology available on FRAND terms in exchange for partici-
pation in the standard-setting process.
284 See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1083 (W.D.
Wis. 2012) (“To form a valid contract under Wisconsin law, there must be evidence of an
offer, acceptance and consideration, and an understanding between the parties regarding the
essential terms of the contract. Apple’s expert states that French law requires the same general
elements, which Motorola has not disputed.” (internal citations omitted)).
285 See, e.g., id. at 1083–85. In some FRAND cases, the parties have not disputed whether
the SEP holder’s FRAND commitment is a contract. The courts in such cases consequently did
not examined whether the SEP holder’s commitment met the necessary elements of a contract.
See, e.g., Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1005 (N.D. Cal.
2013) (“There is no dispute in this case that defendants entered into a binding contract with the
IEEE to license their declared standard-essential patents . . . on RAND terms, and that Realtek
is a third party beneficiary to that contract.”).
286 Apple, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 1083–85.
287 Id. at 1084.
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However, commentators have criticized the conclusion that partici-
pation in the SSO constitutes consideration that the SEP holder receives
in exchange for agreeing to offer its SEPs on FRAND terms.288 For ex-
ample, ETSI’s Rules of Procedure provide that, when ETSI becomes
aware of the existence of an SEP, it shall immediately request that the
patent holder clarify whether it is willing to license its SEPs on FRAND
terms.289 However, the SEP holder’s voluntary submission of a FRAND
commitment is not a condition of its participation in the standard-setting
process. If the SEP holder is ultimately unwilling to license its patented
technology on FRAND terms, ETSI’s rules specify an elaborate series of
steps to attempt to resolve the issue.290 Ultimately, if an SEP is not avail-
able on FRAND terms, ETSI might modify the standard to exclude that
technology.291 However, nothing in the ETSI IPR policy states or implies
that ETSI will exclude from the standard-setting process an SEP holder
that fails to submit a FRAND commitment.292 Thus, in the ETSI case, it
would be incorrect to state that an SEP holder agrees to license its SEPs
on FRAND terms in exchange for participation in the SSO. In other
words, ETSI’s grant of membership cannot constitute consideration that
the SEP holder receives for agreeing to the FRAND commitment. If a
court finds that the SSO has provided no consideration in exchange for
the FRAND commitment, it might conclude, depending on the applicable
contract law, that the FRAND commitment is not a binding contract.
Not surprisingly, the ITC has been cautious in interpreting FRAND
commitments to be contracts. For example, in Certain Wireless Devices
with 3G and/or 4G Capabilities and Components Thereof, Judge Essex
questioned whether InterDigital’s FRAND commitment to ETSI consti-
tuted a binding contract.293 He said that the ETSI Rules of Procedure,
which created “InterDigital’s obligations as a result of its membership in
ETSI,” were “not a contract,” but merely provided “rules to guide the
parties in their interactions with the organization, other members, and
third parties.”294 Judge Essex noted that the ETSI Rules of Procedure left
many terms, such as “adequate and fairly rewarded,” undefined.295 He
said that, although French contract law (which was applicable in that
288 See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments and
Other Patent Pledges, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 479, 504–06 (2015).
289 ETSI IPR Policy, supra note 275, § 6.1 (emphasis added). R
290 Id. § 8.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Certain Wireless Devices with 3G and/or 4G Capabilities & Components Thereof,
Inv. No. 337-TA-868, Pub. 2929, 2014 WL 2965327, at *75–76 (USITC June 13, 2014) (Ini-
tial); see also USITC Inv. No. 377-TA-613 Final, supra note 233, at 40–41. R
294 Certain Wireless Devices with 3G and/or 4G Capabilities & Components Thereof,
2014 WL 2965327, at *75.
295 Id.
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case) “allows a contract to be made without including the price in the
contract, . . . the ETSI documents in question create[d] many more fac-
tors that must be examined before the FRAND obligation is trig-
gered.”296 He concluded that “the agreement is not a contract itself, but
rather an agreement in principal.”297 If the ITC determines that the SEP
holder’s FRAND commitment does not meet the necessary elements of a
contract, it might conclude that the FRAND commitment imposes no
obligations on the SEP holder beyond those of a public pledge.298
Unfortunately, Ambassador Froman provided no instruction regard-
ing the enforceability of a FRAND commitment, leaving open the ques-
tion of whether the ITC should examine the enforceability of the
FRAND agreement.
CONCLUSION
Upon finding a § 337 violation, the ITC must issue an exclusion
order unless the statutorily enumerated public-interest factors advise
against the use of such a remedy. The ITC confirmed that this basic prin-
ciple applies for regular patents, as well as for FRAND-committed SEPs.
President Obama’s 2013 veto of an ITC exclusion order against products
that infringed SEPs instructed the ITC to examine in its public-interest
analysis whether evidence of patent holdup or patent holdout advises
against the issuance of an exclusion order. The ITC consequently scruti-
nized in detail allegations of patent holdup, and of the SEP holder’s fail-
ure to comply with the FRAND commitment. However, in none of the
investigations did the ALJ find that the empirical evidence supported
those allegations, let alone that the evidence supported the denial of an
exclusion order. It is thus evident that unsupported allegations of patent
holdup are insufficient to preclude the ITC’s issuance of an exclusion
order.
When examining evidence of patent holdup, the ITC should base its
determination on factual evidence obtained during the investigation. The
most relevant inquiry is whether the SEP holder has made the respondent
an offer to license its SEPs on FRAND terms. If the SEP holder has
made a genuine FRAND offer, by definition, there cannot be patent
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 That an SEP holder’s FRAND commitment lacks the elements necessary to create a
bilateral contract does not necessarily imply that the commitment creates no obligations for the
SEP holder. For example, a FRAND commitment might be enforceable under a different
framework, such as a unilateral contract or promissory estoppel. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“A promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person
and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise.”).
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holdup. Only when the ITC does not have any licensing offers to evalu-
ate should it consider, for purposes of determining whether the complain-
ant has engaged in holdup, whether the SEP holder has failed to take the
necessary steps to initiate negotiations with the respondent and has vio-
lated any obligations arising from its FRAND commitment. Because
§ 337 provides that the ITC shall issue an exclusion order unless consid-
eration of the public-interest factors counsels against such remedy, it is
properly the respondent’s burden to offer evidence of patent holdup, and
thereby demonstrate that, in that specific case, the public interest in
avoiding patent holdup outweighs the benefits of issuing an exclusion
order.
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